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Probabilistic connectivity problems arise naturally in many social networks.
In particular the spread of an epidemic across a population and social trust inference
motivate much of our work. We examine problems where some property, such as an
infection or influence, starts from some initially seeded set of nodes and every af-
fected node transmits the property to its neighbors with a probability determined by
the connecting edge. Many problems in this area involve connectivity in a random-
graph - the probability of a node being affected is the probability that there is a
path to it in the random-graph from one of the seed nodes. We may wish to aid,
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officials wish to minimize an epidemic’s spread over a population, and connectiv-
ity in a social network suggests how closely tied its users are. In support of these
and other applications, we study several combinatorial optimization problems on
random-graphs. We derive algorithms and demonstrate their effectiveness through
simulation, mathematical proof, or both.
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Probabilistic connectivity problems arise naturally in many social networks.
In particular the spread of an epidemic across a population and social trust inference
motivate much of our work. We examine problems where some property, such as an
infection or influence, starts from some initially seeded set of nodes and every af-
fected node transmits the property to its neighbors with a probability determined by
the connecting edge. Many problems in this area involve connectivity in a random-
graph - the probability of a node being affected is the probability that there is a
path to it in the random-graph from one of the seed nodes. We may wish to aid,
disrupt, or simply monitor this connectivity. In our core applications, public health
officials wish to minimize an epidemic’s spread over a population, and connectiv-
ity in a social network suggests how closely tied its users are. In support of these
and other applications, we study several combinatorial optimization problems on
random-graphs. We derive algorithms and demonstrate their effectiveness through
simulation, mathematical proof, or both.
The common thread running through these problems is the connectivity in a
random graph, and so our main techniques to tackle them come from graph con-
nectivity algorithms and probability theory. Since connectivity probabilities are
#P-complete to measure even in simplified forms [94], we cannot efficiently calcu-
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late them exactly. To obtain estimates of these values, we rely on random sampling.
Beyond that, we make heavy use of standard algorithm design techniques including
linear programming, dynamic programming, greedy algorithms (with analyses using
the probabilistic method), non-linear optimization, and more.
1.1 Epidemiology
One of the most pressing settings for these types of problems, and that which
we study in the most depth, is that of epidemic transmission across a population.
The recent outbreaks of SARS [13] and H1N1 flu [83] serve to highlight the impor-
tance of epidemic prevention and mitigation. Various countermeasures have been
studied in great depth, including decreasing transmission rates (better personal hy-
giene or face masks), social distancing (closing schools, encouraging people to stay
home when sick), and pharmaceuticals (vaccination, anti-virals). These measures
have been studied most thoroughly by assuming a uniform mixing model of the
population and applying differential equations. These uniform mixing models have
evolved greatly from their introduction by Kermack and McKendrick [65]. Modern
models take into account a network’s degree structure [12], heterogeneous mixing
between distinct subpopulations [83], and game theoretic approaches [88] among
other extensions. All of these abstract away the fact that diseases do not jump di-
rectly from an infected person in one country, city, or even neighborhood to another
without a physical link. Studies that do consider a fixed contact network over which
an epidemic propagates tend to focus on purely simulation based results [43, 40, 38]
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or look at the contact network for only a subset of the graph such as air travel-
ers [60, 59]. The theoretical results about contact networks usually involve whether
or not a disease will spread to a large fraction of people instead of how to combat
the epidemic [87, 21].
Our work in Chapter 3 bridges the gap between simulation based epidemic
minimization and mathematical results for when an unchecked epidemic will be
wide-spread. We focus on using the graph-theoretic aspects of the local structure
of disease transmissions and attempt to develop better targeted algorithms for the
applying epidemic countermeasures. The idealized goal of this research is to answer
questions such as “given the social contact graph and disease model details, how
can we use information that would be available to public health officials in real-time
to optimally allocate limited intervention resources to minimize the total number
sick/deaths/cost/etc. of the epidemic”.
Within this framework we develop network-aware interventions to minimize
the effect of an epidemic within the general population. Here, as in all of our studies,
we use a two pronged approach. First we derive theoretical results wherever possible
for the effectiveness of our intervention strategies. Our most important result in
Section 3.1 is the discovery that any “small” set of nodes whose vaccination protects
a large fraction of the population will cumulatively have a large expected subtree
size. While we do not know how to directly find such sets, our result suggests
prioritizing those with high subtree sizes for vaccination. Second, we compare our
theory-driven intervention strategies against existing techniques using simulations.
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The structure of a population’s contact networks plays an important role in
the effectiveness of our algorithms. Therefore we develop these algorithms in a data-
centric way. In networks with high expansion, the giant component results of Chung,
Horn, and Lu [21] come to dominate. In this setting the best containment strategy
reduces the second order average degree (SOAD) below 1. This can be approximated
well in a localized way by targeting nodes who have large incident edge probability
sums. But does this apply to the networks we are interested in? Properties common
to large social networks have been studied extensively [85, 76, 69]. For example
Leskovec et al. perform a large scale study of the conductance of many online social
networks [74]. They conclude that there is a fixed plateau in subset size which does
not depend on network size, where no larger subsets with good conductance exist.
This suggests that we may not find sufficient community structure to improve on the
SOAD-based approach. However real populations have a natural spatial embedding,
and therefore differ in important ways from online networks.
While most epidemic containment literature focuses on protected the general
population, certain subpopulations may require more protection. In an emergency
situation, the effect of losing a large number of people who provide or maintain utili-
ties, police, medical, logistical, or other services is much larger than the direct effects
of the incapacitated individuals themselves. One way to supply extra protection in-
volves removing these societally-critial individuals from the general population, and
isolating them. We call this intervention protective sequestration. At the time of
sequestering, some individuals may be latently infected, bringing the epidemic with
them. In Section 3.2 we develop an algorithm which takes estimates of the latent
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infection probabilities for the sequestered population and partitions them in a way
that minimizes the total expected infections. Using this algorithm we go on to
explore some of trade-offs involved in implementing a sequestering policy.
1.2 Trust Inference
In Chapter 4, we examine the seemingly unrelated area of social network trust
inference. Trust, defined as one person’s confidence that another will behave in
a desired manner [48], is an important property of human interaction, and thus
it is important in the social web as well. Trust can help users make confident
purchases [89], decide what statements are likely to be true [63], or find others with
similar opinions [104]. Direct trust’s usefulness is limited because in a large social
network a user will have direct knowledge of the trustworthiness of only a small
fraction of others. For trust to be useful in these settings, we need an algorithm
that uses direct trust ratings to infer trust between any two users.
We will not consider methods to directly calculate the trust between users,
but instead we rely on the network of users rating the “trustworthiness” of their
neighbors. Several different varieties of trust inference algorithms have been pro-
posed [103, 70, 31, 77], each with its own strengths and weaknesses. These techniques
estimate trus in a simulation-based way, and none of them have a simple mathe-
matical structure that can be exploited. In Section 4.1 we fill in this gap with an
algorithm based upon a novel and intuitive interpretation where direct trust ratings
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are taken to be edge probabilities and inferred trust is the probability that a trust
path exists between two endpoints.
This random graph interpretation has many benefits to explore and imple-
mentation challenges to overcome. We observe that the log of the inverse of the
path probabilities in a symmetric trust graph form a trust metric space. This im-
mediately admits an extensive array of metric space algorithms, such as clustering
and visualization, on our trust dataset. Clustering in particular is an important
applications, and we examine, both theoretically and empirically, several ways in
which we can cluster based upon trust. Additionally we can use the relationship
between direct trust and inferred trust to quickly identify edges which have a large
effect on the graph. Any edge whose direct trust is significantly smaller than the
inferred trust is in a sense redundant, while those whose direct trust comprises most
of the inferred trust are critical.
We encounter several challenges when implementing this algorithm and apply-
ing it to real datasets. These datasets typically have some way of quantifying the
direct trust on an edge. Our first challenge involves carefully choosing a mapping
from trust values to edge probabilities so that we produce informative results. The
mapping should be set high enough that trust spreads sufficiently, but low enough
that most path probabilities do not approach one. As a general rule, we find that
choosing this mapping so that a giant component just barely forms produces good
results. The second major challenge is scalability. Computing path probabilities
exactly is #P-complete, so we use random sampling to estimate the probabilities
accurately. Storing these pairwise estimates explicitly takes space O(|V |2) which is
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not good enough for very large networks. Instead, for k samples we store O(k · |V |)
values from which computing a single pair’s connectivity probability takes time
O(k).
Our initial algorithm, as well as most trust inference schemes, considers only
positive trust. In this setting, any edge indicates more trust than a lack of an
edge, and there is no way for a user to differentiate between not knowing someone
and knowing someone to be dishonest. Some studies have specifically addressed
distrust [105], but none present fully satisfying approaches that integrate trust and
distrust. In Section 4.2 we develop a method based upon spring embedding - a
simulated process where positive edges attract and negative edges repel, and we
combine these results with our positive-only path probability algorithm. We discuss
some of this technique’s properties and validate it on the hidden-sign predictions
problem – where we remove some edges from the graph and attempt to infer their
signs from the remaining graph. We find that by combining when endpoint path
probabilities and spring embedding distances into a set of two-dimensional points,
we can infer hidden edge signs quite well for a number of large networks.
Trust inference can be used directly to inform one user about another, but it
can also be used to partition users into groups with high intra-group trust. There
are two ways that we can validate how well our algorithm clusters a network. First,
we can show how to do something well using the clusters. DuBois et al. show
the such clusters can help improve recommender system accuracy [33]. Second,
we can show that the resulting clusters resemble some inherent groupings within
the dataset. Unfortunately we are unable to find any large social networks with
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meaningful, non-trivial groups highlighted for comparison. Even if we did, there
would be no reason to believe that the supplied grouping was the only one that
made sense. In order to test our algorithm at a proof-of-concept level, in Section 4.3
we create an artificial network where the clusters are well defined, but non-trivial to
infer from the network alone. We visually demonstrate that the spring-embedding
algorithms reconstructs the clusters quite well.
As networks scale into the millions of nodes and beyond, our trust inference
techniques may not be fast enough for some applications. In Section 4.4 we develop
a linear-time, randomized algorithm for clustering. While we empirically examine its
application to trust networks, our algorithm has probabilistic approximation guar-
antees which apply to any system where clusterings can only be sampled randomly
from a black-box. Using either of two distance metrics on clusterings we prove that
our resulting clustering is within a factor of 2 or 3 of optimal in expectation. We also
show how repeated sampling can reduce the probability of producing a clustering




Since we develop algorithms with rigorous proofs behind them, in this section
we present a brief overview of some related mathematical methods and ideas. We
do this with a focus towards their use in our work. In addition, we introduce some
of our mathematical constructs which are useful throughout our research.
All of our work involves some sort of connectivity in random graphs. Erdős
and Rényi’s pioneering work [36] in this area considered a complete graph on n
vertices where each edge is kept with probability p. They show that if np > 1+Ω(1)
then with high probability the largest connected component has size Θ(n) and if
np < 1 − Ω(1) then all of the components will almost certainly be O(logn). This
result is a discrete analog of the reproductive number R0 [79] in epidemiology (the
number of secondary infections resulting from a single initial infection). If a single
person (or node) will connect with more than one other (R0 > 1 or np > 1) then the
number of infections increases exponentially with time and a large number of others
will be affected. If s single person connects with less than one other (R0 < 1 or
np < 1), an epidemic will die out exponentially with time. We are most interested
in the existence of giant components in epidemiology (we want our control measures
to stop their formation) and trust inference parameter selection (the probability of
keeping edges should be kept small enough that giant components do not dominate).
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Of course these networks are rarely complete graphs, so we rely on the many
extensions available in the literature. Two of the most relevant are those of Moore
and Newman [87] which analyses the formation of a giant component on a small-
world network (a type of network proposed by Jon Kleinberg that combines many
local and few long-range edges to yield fast, decentralized routing [67]), and of
Chung, Horn, and Lu [21]. The latter of these builds on powerful spectral graph
theory techniques [19] to establish edge probabilities which bring about a giant
component for a large class of graphs. They show that for most graphs with second
order average degree (the sum of the squares of the degrees divided by the sum of
the degrees) of d̂, a giant component develops if and only if p is at least 1/d̂.
While the existence of a giant component relates to our goals, on a more fine
grained level we are interested in the connectivity probability between individual
pairs of nodes. Measuring these probabilities is #P -complete [94]. Fortunately
we can sample instances of the random graph some k times, and for each pair
u, v record the number of times they are connected Xu,v. Since the samples are
independent, we can apply Chernoff bounds [18] to the probability that our estimates
deviate significantly from their expected value. Specifically, the probability that
Xu,v/k deviates from the true connectivity probability E[Xu,v/k] by more than δ
is at most 2e−k
2δ2/E[Xu,v] ≤ 2e−kδ2 . If we set k as low as O(logn/δ2), we can then
apply Markov’s inequality to each X value simultaneously and find that with high
probability all E[X/k] values will be estimated simultaneously to within δ. We use
this same technique of random sampling in several other places as well, including
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accurately estimate the number of infections that can be traced back through a
specific node.
Once we have connectivity probability estimates, we use them to establish a
metric space on the nodes as follows. For any nodes u and v with connectivity
probability p, define their distance as d(u, v) = log 1/p. As long as the edges are
chosen independently and we consider any two nodes which are always connected
to be equivalent, d satisfies all of the properties of a metric space. Namely ∀u, v :
d(u, v) = log 1/p ≥ 0
d(u, v) = log 1/p = d(v, u)
d(u, w) = log 1/pu,w ≤ log 1/(pu,v · pv,w) = d(u, v) + d(v, w).
The last property holds because the existence of a path in a random-graph is
a monotone function of the edges kept by the random graph – once a path exists,
adding more edges can not disrupt the path. Therefore, by the FKG inequality, the
probability of paths from u to v and v to w (which implies a path from u to w) is at
least the product of the individual probabilities of the two paths. In the case where
edges in the graph are directed, this formulation yields an asymmetric metric space.
Since we have a novel metric space on the nodes where the further apart two
nodes are, the lower the probability of a path between them, we can make use of
existing metric clustering algorithms to partition the nodes. A clustering algorithm
takes a set of points in a metric space and groups them in a way that tries to
optimize some property related to the groups’ internal closeness. Examples include,
k-centers which finds a set of k points S which minimizes the maximum distance
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from any point to its closest point in S, k-means which partitions the points into
k sets in a way that minimizes the variance within each group, and correlation
clustering which partitions the points in a way that minimizes the sum of distances
within groups minus the sum of distances across groups. Each of these clustering
objective functions have good approximation algorithms when applied to points in
a symmetric metric space [56, 64, 8, 1], and some even have good approximations
in an asymmetric metric space [3].
In applying our algorithms to real networks, the network expansion can sig-
nificantly affect the outcomes. Define E(S, T ) to be the set of edges with one end-
point in S and the other in T . The edge expansion ǫ of a graph (V,E) is defined as
minS⊆V,|S|<|V |/2 |E(S, S)|/|S|, or the minimum over all “small” subsets S of the ratio
of edges leaving S to the size of S. To understand how expansion affects our applica-
tions, consider the expander mixing lemma as applied to a d-regular graph [4]. The
lemma says that given a d-regular graph with a second highest eigenvalue magnitude
λ,












|S| · |T |.
High expansion restricts λ to be small, in which case the number of edges between
any two sets S and T is close to what we would expect in a random d-regular graph.
Intuitively this means that the higher a graph’s expansion, the closer it behaves
to the differential model of propagation. We can also think of this as saying that
the lower the expansion, the more the network’s structure can be exploited. As a
simple example, consider a contact network where a relatively small number of edge
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removals can contain an epidemic by significantly reducing the size of the largest
component. Because the large contained set of nodes must have a small number
of edges to the rest of the graph, such a graph cannot have high expansion. For
a thorough discussion of expander graphs, see the survey by Hoory, Linial, and
Wigderson [58].
Since our work centers on random graphs, we also make use of a number of
powerful probabilistic techniques. We already discussed the application of taking in-
dependent (or negatively correlated) random samples and applying Chernoff bounds
to their sum. When random variables are not independent, we turn to other meth-
ods. One such method is the linearity of expectation. It says that for any two
random variables A and B, regardless of their dependence E[A+B] = E[A]+E[B].
We also make use of union bounds, which say for any random events A and B, the
probability that either happens is at most the sum of their individual probabilities.
In some cases we have an explicit, limited dependency structure that we can exploit
to show bounds much tighter than if there was no structure. In these cases, we may
be able to apply large deviation bounds such as those of Fortuin, Kasteleyn, and
Ginibre [41] and Janson [61].
In addition to the mathematical techniques we use, we also use some pro-
gramming techniques that warrant a brief overview. The most significant of these
is dynamic programming. Dynamic programming breaks a problem into smaller
subproblems of the same type which can be efficiently combined into a solution
to the larger problem. Consider an example we use as a subroutine in one of
our algorithms: given k independent indicator random variables X1, . . .Xk, what
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is the probability distribution on their sum
∑k
l=1Xl? To solve this problem, cre-
ate a k by k array A, and solve for Ai,j equals the probability that
∑i
l=1Xl = j.
The ith row contains the distribution we want. Initialize the trivial entries of Ai,j
when i = 1 or j = 1. For all other entries, the probability that
∑i
l=1Xl = j is
Pr[Xi = 0] · Ai−1,j + Pr[Xi = 1] · Ai−1,j−1. Thus we iterative build up solutions to




Infectious diseases, and particularly respiratory infectious diseases, account
for a large fraction of deaths worldwide [66]. In addition to the seasonal flu that
takes a significant toll on health and productivity, we have the ever looming threat
of a global pandemic. The main public health response to contain these outbreaks
consists of increased detection and isolation of infected individuals, changing contact
patterns by closing schools or other institutions, and giving anti-virals or (once an
effective vaccine is prepared) vaccines to large segments of the population [43, 40, 38].
Broadly, the research into epidemic containment uses one of two categories of models
for how the disease spreads: ones that assume some variant of uniform mixing
populations and use differential equations, and ones that take into account the
contact network structure. Most of these take a close look at some aspect of the
epidemic transmission process (such as mixing rates of different subpopulations [83],
air travelers [60, 59], or disease parameter uncertainty [99]), and evaluate the effects
of several heuristic mitigation strategies using simulations. See the survey conducted
by Meyers [84] for a more thorough description of a wide range of studies in the area.
Most of this work uses the SIR model, and so do we. This model dictates
that individuals can be in one of three main states for which the model is named:
susceptible, infectious, or recovered. Susceptible people become infected through
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contact with an infected individual, infected people eventually recover, and recovered
people retain an immunity and neither spread the disease nor become infected again.
There are other models (susceptible, infectious, susceptible, or SIS for example),
however SIR corresponds most naturally to diseases where vaccinations are effective,
which is our concentration.
We adopt a further refinement of the SIR model where the transmission of the
disease from an infected individual to an uninfected one happens probabilistically
with a constant rate per unit of contact time [90]. Therefore if there is a fixed amount
of contact time between two people, we can simplify their edge in the contact graph
by giving it a single probability p of remaining in the graph. Once we reduce the
contacts to probabilistic edges, a person will become infected if and only if they are in
the same connected component as one of the initial seeds of the epidemic. This view
motivates our focus on graph cut-like problems. If we can minimize the expected
size of the components containing infected individuals, we successfully minimize
the epidemic’s spread. Note that in this analysis, time is not considered explicitly.
Rather, it is implicitly embedded in the probabilistic edges and the lengths of paths.
A substantial portion of our work on epidemic containment focuses on re-
moving nodes or edges from an existing contact graph. This can correspond to
vaccination, administering anti-virals, or social distancing. The problems take the
form: given a graph G, a disease model, probabilistic information about who is
currently infected, and a resource constrained countermeasure, how can we apply
the countermeasure to minimize some epidemic cost function. We develop provable
results whenever possible, derive heuristics based upon our findings, and experimen-
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tally validated these heuristics. Conducting controlled experiments in the field is
impractical for many reasons. Therefore in order to generate experimental results
we use the EpiFast simulation infrastructure developed at the Network Dynamics
and Simulation Science Laboratory which is part of the Virginia Bioinformatics In-
stitute at Virginia Tech [38]. This setup includes several large scale datasets where
a city or region-wide person-person graph is constructed implicitly from a detailed
and realistic person-location graph, as well as a distributed program which simulates
the progress of an epidemic across these populations. We describe EpiFast in more
detail in Section 5.1.
In Section 3.1 we start our technical discussion with an algorithm for targeted
vaccinations. Given a social contact graph and probabilistic information on the
initially infected set, we create estimates, for each node, of the expected number of
nodes infected through that node which we call the node’s expected subtree size.
We do this through repeated simulation, where for each simulation we record the
paths the epidemic takes. For each node, we count its subtree size, and take the
average over many iterations. We need O(logn) simulations to have highly accurate
estimates of the expected subtree sizes for all nodes in the graph. Vaccinating
one person, and therefore decreasing or elimination its subtree does not necessarily
reduce the epidemic much, as other subtrees many become larger. The key here is
to find groups of nodes whose mutual vaccination significantly diminishes the total
epidemic size. This subtree based method has the nice property: if there exists a set
of nodes S such that their vaccination reduces the total expected outbreak size by X,
then the sum of their expected subtree sizes is at least X. Roughly this means that
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under certain conditions, if there exists a small group of nodes whose vaccination
will save much of the graph, then we can find a (hopefully not too large) superset
of that set efficiently.
We empirically compare this algorithm with three others: one that vaccinates
randomly, one that vaccinates in decreasing order of infection probability, and one
that vaccinates purely based on local criteria - the sum of a nodes incident edge
probabilities. Random vaccinations provide a base-line from which to measure im-
provement. Vaccinating based upon infection probability is one of the simplest
global heuristics. We chose vaccination by decreasing order or local connectivity for
several reasons. First, there are spectral reasons to believe it should be effective.
Specifically, it approximates a strategy which decreases the graph’s second order
average degree (SOAD) as much as possible and thus significantly decreases the
largest eigenvalue as well. In addition, it is an easier strategy to implement in a
real-world setting because estimating local connectivity is a simpler problem than
reconstructing a full contact network.
While evaluating the strength of these algorithms is important, we also wish
to understand why the algorithms perform as well as they do. To do this, we need
to understand the data they are operating on. Networks that are good expanders by
definition do not have small sets of nodes whose protection will stop an epidemic. In
these cases, the spectral based methods may be the best available. However networks
with a natural embedding of their nodes, such as a geographical embedding, may
admit much better solutions. We use spectral measures to describe the New River
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Area contact network, argue intuitively why its mathematical description makes
sense, and conjecture how other types of contact networks might differ.
Then we move to a discussion about protective sequestering, a mitigation
strategy designed to protect a small critical population from an epidemic in the
general population. Sequestering involves taking the critical population out of the
general population and placing them into isolated groups (because of logistical rea-
sons isolating individuals by themselves is impractical, instead we think of groups
as being tens, hundreds, or even thousands of people). These groups could naturally
correspond to a military barracks, a section of a hospital, or any other geographi-
cally or socially isolated location. If these groups are kept sufficiently isolated, the
only members who become infected are those who were latently infected before se-
questering began and those whom they subsequently infect. There are two main
challenges involved with sequestering in a useful way. The first is how to trigger the
sequestering process, and the second is how to partition people into groups. We have
considerable work done on when to trigger the sequestering, and under certain con-
ditions we have an optimal partitioning algorithm. We present our algorithm along
with several refinements that make it more efficient in both space and time. Then
we study several tradeoffs inherent in any real-world use of protective sequestering.
These results come from the joint work of myself and others currently available as
a technical report [15].
We finish this section with a look at what happens to the degree sequence of
a graph when its edges are subject to independently random removal. The degree
sequence of a graph is a list d1, . . . dk where, for all degrees i, di is the number of
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nodes with degree i. Degree sequences are one of many well-studied parameters of
large graphs, and many other properties often relate to it. Rather than focusing on
a particular degree sequence, people often study asymptotic ones. Common classes
of degree sequence include exponential (as in a G(n, p) random graph), power-law
(which for a time was thought to characterize many large graphs [39, 10, 11, 68]), and
stretched-exponential[26]. We derive three categories of smooth degree sequences,
and for each we show how the degree sequence changes after independently random
edge removals. Our results take the form of a new sequence of expected degrees plus
large deviation bounds from these expectations.
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3.1 Vaccination Strategies
We start our discussion of vaccination strategies with an overview of the disease
model we use. When a new flu-like epidemic first infects a human population, it
spreads from host to host in a discrete and localized way. We model this localization
by placing an edge between any two people who come into sufficient contact that
a transmission may occur. Parameterizing these edges presents a challenge since
the details of how the contagion travels across an edge from one host to another
can be very complex. Different individuals have varying levels of natural immunity,
infection incubation periods, infectious periods, personal hygiene, etc. Whether or
not a potential transmission occurs similarly depends upon a large number of factors
including closeness and duration of contact, type of interaction, and air temperature.
Rather than fix our algorithm to one set of parameters, we hide the details
of how the disease travels within a black box simulator. We only require that the
simulator output, for a random progression of the epidemic, a forest rooted at the
initially infected nodes. In this forest, every non-root node has a parent from which
it acquired the infection. Our later experiments use the EpiFast [14] simulator,
which we describe in detail in Section 5.1.
Thus we take as given a population of size n, a probability distribution on
who becomes initially infected and when, a simulator which encapsulates all of the
other disease parameters, and a number k of 100% effective vaccines to take effect
on the dth day of the infection. Our goal is to find a set of people to vaccinate who
minimize the expected number of total infections (or a weighted sum of those who
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sets of nodes to
vaccinate, and choose the best one, but we want to do better.
3.1.1 Algorithms and Analysis
In order to build up to our algorithm, we begin by contrasting this problem
with other optimization problems. Let us start with the work on deterministic,
budgeted edge removal by Hayrapetyan et al [54]. They set up a linear program
where every node v has an infection level Iv in the interval [0, 1]. The algorithm
chooses, for each edge e, how much to remove that edge, or Re. The total edges
removed
∑
e Re must be at most the budget B. Every node’s infection level is the
maximum over all of its incident edges of the neighbors infection level minus the
connecting edges removal level, or Iv = maxu:(v,u)∈E Iu −Ru,v. The free variables in
this formulation are the edge removals, and the optimization is over the sum of the
infections. They show how to use random rounding to go over budget by at most
a factor of 1/λ while infecting at most a factor of 1/(1− λ) more than an optimal
solution for any λ. They go on to show how to achieve the same results using a
more efficient min-cut based approach.
We encounter three types of problems trying to adapt this approach to a
random graph. The first is that good cuts may be passed over because they contain
edges which are unlikely to be in the final graph. The second is that it may be
infeasible to completely isolate the infection, but removing high degree (or otherwise
important nodes) may be sufficient to stop the epidemic. The LP based approach
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creates rings of total protection around the initial infections, and has no way of
considering this type of solution. Finally, we want to handle cases with a dynamic
set of initial infections. It is not clear how to adapt their method to uncertainty in
where the epidemic starts.
An intuitively appealing strategy involves simulating the epidemic, and vacci-
nation those with the highest probability of infection first. As an immediate benefit
we observe that those with the highest infection probabilities contribute the most
direct effect on the total number of infections. Therefore, if network affects could
be ignored, this would be the most effective strategy. Additionally, nodes can only
pass along the disease if they contract it. Therefore, and once again ignoring the
importance of network location, nodes which are more likely to fall ill have a greater
chance of spreading the disease.
There are several related drawbacks with this approach. First, a node which
often becomes infected but is otherwise isolated could still have a high infection
probability. Vaccinating such a node only decreases the expected outbreak size by
at most one. Second, it ignores correlations. For example, consider a clique where
one of its members connects to an initially infected node. Every node in the clique
is almost as likely as the bridge node to become infected, but there is no marginal
benefit to vaccinating these other nodes.
This led us to the notion of a set of nodes’ criticality - the difference that their
mutual vaccination has on the expected outbreak size. This notion aligns nicely with
our goal, which we can restate as finding the most critical set of size k. For any fixed









Figure 3.1: Consider the network above where an initially infected node I is con-
nected to the general population (the cloud) by three disjoint paths with edge prob-
abilities of one. The criticality of any strict subset of {A,C,E} is zero, while the
criticality of the entire set is high. Also, the criticalities of {A,C,E} and {B,D, F}
are both high, but there is no marginal benefit in vaccinating both sets rather than
just the first.
we cannot efficiently try all sets of size k, we need another way to find a good set.
We evaluated a number of standard methods including greedily building the set and
using various matroid techniques [16]. Unfortunately for our purposes, criticality
does not compose well. Two sets with large criticality may overlap completely so
that their union is no more critical than one of them alone. On the other hand,
the union of two sets with extremely low criticality may have high criticality. See
Figure 3.1 for specific examples.
Before we present our main algorithm, we present one more alternative which
follows naturally from the giant component work of Chung et al. [21]. They show
that given a graph with largest eigenvalue λ and each edge kept with probability
p, p = 1/λ is the cutoff point between a giant component forming or not. They
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argue that since λ = Θ(d̂), this results can simplify to show that the transition
happens when p = Θ(1/d̂). Equivalently we can say that the giant component
forms when the second order average expected degree (SOAED), which we define
as the sum of the squares of the expected degrees squared divided by the sum of
the expected degrees, is one. They show this cutoff for when edge probabilities are
uniform, but we build our algorithm under the assumption that a similar cutoff
exists for general edge probabilities. This idea leads to a vaccination strategy that
tries to minimize the SOAED. We approximate SOAED minimization as well as give
an algorithm that could realistically approximated in the real-world by vaccinating
people in decreasing order of their expected final degrees.
All of these ideas are helpful, but they still do not necessarily help us find small
sets whose vaccination significantly reduces infections. We need to look deeper into
what properties such a set must have. To this end, we derive the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Let a random graph be given with probabilities on each of its directed
edges and a probability distribution on which nodes become initially infected. Con-
sider the random process where each edge is chosen independently at random creating
a potential transmission graph. From that graph, an initially infected set, and a vac-
cinated set, a deterministic process creates a particular infection tree by iteratively
adding an arbitrary edge which connects an infected node to a susceptible one until
no such edges remain.
Let random variable X(A) be the cumulative number of infections if the set
A is vaccinated and random variable Sv be the size of the infection subtree rooted
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at node v or 0 if v does not become infected. For any set A of nodes to vaccinate,
∑
v∈A E[Sv] ≥ E[X({})]− E[X(A)].
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1 though a conditioning argument. Let random variable
T be the potential transmission graph, Γ be the set of all potential transmission
graphs, and for any γ ∈ Γ, let F (γ, A) be the infection forest resulting from γ and
vaccinating the nodes A. Let |F (γ, A)| denote the number of nodes in the forest so
that X(A) = |F (T,A)|. Furthermore, note that the nodes in the forest are exactly
those reachable from an initially infected node in the potential transmission graph.
By the definition of the expected value, E[X(A)] =
∑
γ∈Γ Pr[T = γ]·|F (γ, A)|.
Similarly, we can express the expected number of nodes protected as E[X({}) −
X(A)] =
∑
γ∈Γ Pr[T = γ] · (|F (γ, {})− F (γ, A)|). For a fixed γ, and any node
v ∈ F (γ, {}) − F (γ, A), all paths from an initially infected node to v must have
passed through A. And thus v must have been in at least one subtree of A.
We can now show the entire bound:






















Theorem 1 can be restated as follows: if there is a set of size k whose joint
vaccination protects l people in expectation, than the sum of their expected subtree
sizes is at least l. We can take this even further using the pigeon hole principle and
say that the minimum expected subtree size is at least l/k.
This property inspires our main vaccination algorithm: vaccinating by average
subtree size. Recall that for each infected node our black box simulator outputs
who directly infected that node. This creates an infection forest rooted at all of the
initially infected nodes. A post-order traversal of this tree allows us to calculate
the subtree sizes for each node in linear time. If the problem specifies that vaccines
are to be given on day d, then we only count subtrees rooted at day d or later. We
repeatedly sample such epidemic simulations to get average subtree sizes that closely
approximate the actual expected subtree sizes with high probability. We then select
the k nodes with the highest expected subtree size. The algorithm remains the same
regardless of the distribution on initial infections, transmission probabilities, etc.
A subtree size approach addresses some of the problems with heuristics dis-
cussed previously. It still biases the vaccination towards nodes which are often
infected, but unlike vaccination based upon infection probability it places more em-
phasis on how many active infection paths went through a node. This means that a
node at which the epidemic frequently comes to a dead-end will receive low priority.
Similarly, nodes which sometimes carry the infection to many others, but for which
there are a large number of alternate paths will also receive lower priorities.
Vaccinating by subtree size has some of the same drawbacks too. High priority
nodes may be strongly correlated, so vaccinating either could be almost as good as
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vaccinating only one. Additionally, a deep epidemic forest can lead to many nodes
having high subtree sizes. In this case a small critical set may be obscured by many
less important nodes with larger expected subtrees. On the other hand, shallow
epidemic trees lead to much smaller subtrees, and thus critical sets which stand out
more.
3.1.2 Empirical Results
We perform a large number of simulations in order to empirically validate
our subtree size based algorithm compared with the others we discussed, as well
as understand how various parameters affect their behavior. For this study we use
a dataset approximating the population of approximation 160,000 people in the
New River area – that is the area in and around Virginia Tech. Virginia Tech is a
large university with roughly 30,000 students plus many additional faculty and staff.
It acts as a focal point for this population, perhaps giving it atypical population
dynamics – small network diameter, faster mixing, etc.
This datset does not explicitly contain a person-person contact network. In-
stead it consists of a person-location graph which implicitly gives the person-person
graph [38]. A person-location graph is bipartite and connects every individual to the
locations they visit throughout the day. Each such edge lists when the person visited
that location, and what type of activity they engaged in. From here two people are
implicitly connected if they are in the same location at the same time. Maintaining











Figure 3.2: The left graph is a person-location graph where boxes A,B, and C are
locations and circles D,E, F , and G are people. The right graph represents the
corresponding person-person graph.
the data for parallel simulation. Figure 3.2 shows a pictorial representation of a
person-location graph and its implicit person-person graph.
While every potential epidemic will behave in a unique way, we focus our
results on one particular set of influenza-like parameters. We run the simulated
epidemic for 200 days using a transmission probability of 4 · 10−5 per minute of
contact between an infectious person and a susceptible person. Once a person
contacts the disease, they remain noninfectious for an incubation period of 1 to 2
days, and then infectious for 3 to 6 days. For each set of parameters, we run 50
simulations to get the statistics which tell us who to vaccinate, and then another 50
to get the results.
In our simulations we study how varying the distribution of initial infections
affects the outcome of the epidemic. We vary the distribution in two ways. First,
we consider starting from the same set for each iteration versus choosing a new
set every time. Using a static set corresponds to knowing an infections current,
fixed state and getting the statistics going forward. Alternatively, choosing a new
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set each time models not knowing where an epidemic will start. We also examine
starting from only 2 infections, which may be small enough to completely contain,
and starting from 10 infections, which produces a much more consistent number of
final infections. Ten initial infections results in 80k final infections, or roughly half
of the total population.
When evaluating different algorithms, we use uniformly random vaccinations
as a baseline. Its results are quite poor. In general, up to 10k vaccinations make
very little difference. Randomly vaccinating 20k and 40k people saves approximation
15k and 35k respectively. A delay in vaccination and causes no significant change in
the final number of infections whether the initially infected set is static or random.
The other parameter, whether there are 2 or 10 initial infections has a noticeable
effect. With 2 initial infections the epidemic dies out fairly often, which brings down
the average number of total infections. If the epidemic does not die out early, the
difference in negligible.
Figure 3.3 contains plots for the static initial infections, while Figure 3.4 con-
tains those for randomized initial infections. All three of the test vaccination strate-
gies perform very similarly to each other. With vaccination delays of 20 days or less,
vaccinating 20k is sufficient to limit the outbreak to a few thousand cases (< 1%
of the population). In most cases vaccinating 5k and 10k save roughly 10k and
30k respectively. Of particular interest is that in almost all of our cases, the local
connectivity based strategy performs slightly better than our other strategies. The
containment based strategies using subtree size and vulnerabilities only perform
better when the initially infected people can be complete isolated. Just as in the
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random vaccination case, the distribution on the initially infected set has little effect
on the final outcome except when the disease dies out very quickly, which happens
more often when there are fewer initial infections.
3.1.3 Network Properties
Our simulation results demonstrate that the vulnerability and subtree-based
heuristics work fairly well, but not quite as well as when we use local connectivity.
This would not be true for all graphs, so what properties of the New River area
graph lead to this outcome, and are those properties true of similarly sized, realistic
contact networks? If most relevant contact networks behave this way, then local
connectivity-based algorithms could be very effective in practice. Can we tell when
a contact network will have this form, and are there other types of networks where
our subtree-based heuristic will perform better?
The New River area consists of Virginia Tech and the surrounding communi-
ties. Out of a total population of nearly 160,000, a full 30,000 of them are students
at the university [100]. Even without counting faculty and staff, these students make
up a very significant fraction of the total population. It is reasonable to assume that
a large number of people spend at least some time on campus in a given day. The
relatively compact geography of the population means those who do not travel to
campus often have friends and neighbors who do. The low average path lengths
(most pairs are within 3 or 4 edges of each other) supports this idea.
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Figure 3.3: This figure contains plots of the mean number of final infections for
the four algorithms. The y-axes give thousands of total infections, and the x-axes
give thousands of vaccinations. Each individual plot shows the results for a specific
vaccination delay and initial infection type. Within a plot, each line corresponds to
one of the four vaccination algorithms, and points are plotted for 5k, 10k, 20k, and
40k vaccinations (out of a population of 160k).
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Figure 3.4: This figure contains plots of the mean number of final infections for the
four algorithms. The details are exactly the same as in Figure 3.3 except the initial
infections in this figure change with each iteration.
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We look at several other important graph properties in addition to average
distance. For these properties, we consider both the deterministic version of the
graph (where all edges are treated equally) and the probabilistic version. For the
probabilistic version, we use the same 4 · 10−5 transmissions per minute as in our
simulations. The degree distribution has a long tail with an average degree of 156
with a standard deviation of 131. The mean expected degree is 1.65 with a similarly
long tail and standard deviation of 1.33. The second order average degree (SOAD) is
2.72. Spectral graph theory suggests that the SOAD asymptotically approximates
the highest eigenvalue, which not too far off at 5.68. To explain our simulation
results we turn to the giant component work of Chung et al. [21]. They show
that given an unweighted, undirected graph and an edge probability p, that a giant
component forms when p > 1/d̂ + Ω(1) and does not form when p < 1/d̂ − Ω(1),
where d̂ is the SOAD. We restate their tipping point as

























which is the second order average expected degree (SOAED). While their results
assume that every edge has the same probability p, the SOAED is well defined
for arbitrary edge probabilities. We hypothesize that to stop an epidemic from
spreading over a network with high mixing, we need to reduce the SOAED below 1.
To test this hypothesis, we vaccinate the same sets of nodes as in our simula-
tions and calculate the resulting SOAED of the network. Without any vaccinations
the SOAED is 2.72 and nearly half of the population becomes infected. All of the






























Figure 3.5: Here we show how SOAED and total infections are related for the
various vaccination strategies. Our targeted interventions exhibit a nearly linear
relationship between SOAED and total infections, with the epidemic completely
isolated at roughly with an SOAED as large as 1.25 – somewhat higher than the
predicted value of 1.
and below 1 with 40K. Figure 3.5 gives a detailed comparison between SOAED and
infections for the case of 10 initial, random infections and a 5 day vaccination delay.
When we prioritize vaccinations by local connectivity, we reduce SOAED
slightly more than when using the other targeted interventions. The fact that
this approach performs better than the others leads us to believe that the New
River area network may be too uniformly connected for there to be any “small” sets
whose mutual vaccination protects a large fraction of the network. State or country-
wide contact networks almost certainly have lower expansion than those covering a
smaller, centralized region, and can thus be exploited better by our subtree-based
heuristic. As the size and scope of realistic, synthetic networks expand, we plan to
expand our study to those networks as well.
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3.2 Sequestering of Critical Sub-Populations
When an epidemic emerges, there is more to safeguarding public health and
safety than minimizing the epidemic’s direct effects. An important problem that
arises in this context is the protection of critical sub-populations such as military and
national guard personnel, emergency responders, and public health officials. This
problem is different from typical public-health problems where the primary goal is to
protect the general population. Sequestering protects smaller sub-populations that
are critical to the effective functioning of society during such large-scale crises by
isolating them in small groups. Protective sequestering’s importance is magnified
when effective vaccines and anti-virals are not quickly available, as in the recent
H1N1 influenza pandemic [27].
The need for protective sequestration is perhaps best highlighted by consider-
ing a military context [35, 66]. Naval ships and military bases contain personnel in
confined settings, wherein infectious diseases can be easily transmitted. Personnel
can be called up and assigned in a way that is carefully designed to minimize their
total infections. This context also provides authorities the level of control necessary
to effectively sequester a population. We study how early estimates of individual
infection-probabilities can help sequester individuals better in such confined set-
tings. In order to minimize the expected spread of the disease, we develop optimal
strategies and discuss their experimental performance and empirical improvements.
In this section we study the problem of protective sequestering of a population
of individuals into small, isolated groups, from a stochastic-optimization perspec-
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tive. Given a priori estimates on the infection probabilities of the people to be
sequestered, along with a natural percolation model for disease-spread, and the
constraints on individual group sizes, how should authorities place the people into
groups in order to minimize the expected outbreak-size of the disease? We give a
polynomial-time algorithm for this problem, and discuss some of the tradeoffs in-
volving group size, epidemic transmission rates, and sequestering trigger threshold.
To put the problem into mathematical notation, we are given: a set V of n
people (or nodes), and a set of groups with capacities m1, m2, . . . , mk. Groups are
rooms or other tightly-constrained locations and are typically small enough that it
is natural to assume that the contact graph induced by a subset V ′ ⊂ V assigned to
a group is complete [91]. Disease transmission is a stochastic percolation process,
in which an infected node spreads the disease to each node in the same group
with some probability. Each person v ∈ V could be exposed to the disease even
before being sequestered - this is captured by a quantity known as the external
infection probability (abbreviated eip) and denoted as sv for node v ∈ V . (We
assume that these initial exposures happen independently for all v ∈ V : i.e., each
v ∈ V independently gets infected initially, with probability sv. The symbol “s”
in sv denotes “susceptibility”.) The eips can be estimated by combining computer
simulations, demographic characteristics and ground measurements [38]. If a set
of nodes V ′ with size v′ is confined to a single group (i.e., if all people in V ′ get
assigned to the same location), a subset U of V ′ becomes initially infected according
to the eips defined above; each of these infected nodes could spread the infection
to every other node in V ′ with a transmission probability, denoted by p. As will be
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discussed later in Section 3.2.1, disease transmission in the complete graph (within
each group) is equivalent to percolation in the Erdős-Rényi random graph G(V ′, p),
and the random set of nodes in V ′ that finally become infected is the set of nodes
reachable in the random-graph from some node in U . The different groups are
isolated from each other and therefore do not interact.
Given the above setup and a partition V1, V2, . . . , Vk of the population V
(wherein |Vi| ≤ mi for all i, for feasibility), we can consider the expected num-
ber of finally-infected nodes, where the expectation is taken both over the random
choice of the initially-infected set given by the eips, as well as the random choices
made in the percolation (disease-spreading) process. The goal of the Sequestering
problem is to find a feasible partitioning so that the expected number of infections
(also referred to as the outbreak size) is minimized. The inputs to the problem
are the person-to-person transmission probability p as well as the values sj , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , n and mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k; the output is the partition.
If the eips vary quite a bit, the partitioning can significantly affect the expected
outbreak size. In particular, the natural heuristic of random assignment can perform
very poorly. A simple example of this is the following: let |V | = k2 and the group
capacities be m1 = m2 = · · · = mk = k. Let si = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k, and sj = 0 for
j > k. Assume the disease is very contagious, so that the presence of an infected
node in a group will infect everyone else in that group: i.e., p is essentially one.
The optimal solution places all of the initial k nodes with si = 1 into one group,
and partition the rest into the remaining k − 1 groups - this would have a cost of
k. However, a random partitioning and assignment of V to the groups will result in
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∼ k(1−1/e) groups having some node i ≤ k, which results in an expected outbreak
of size Θ(k2). The optimal solution in this example groups the nodes according to
similar eip values, and our algorithm is based on this idea; see Figure 3.2 for an
illustration.
What follows is a brief summary of our specific contributions. In Theorem 2
and Corollary 3, we prove the following property which is crucial for the algorithm’s
correctness: for any two groups G1 and G2 in a given optimal solution, either all sv
for v ∈ G1 are less or equal to all su for u ∈ G2, or the other way around. Then we
give the algorithm’s details. Suppose there are r distinct elements from among the
mi – i.e., there are r distinct group-sizes – and that ui is the number of groups with
the ith smallest size. Thus we have
∑r
i=1 ui = k. All groups of the same size and
transmission rate have the same “type”. We develop an algorithm that is polynomial
in n and m, and exponential in the number of types r. We extend our algorithm to
answer the question of when to leave some of the critical population unsequestered.
We follow-up with an analysis of the algorithm’s running time in Section 5.2.1. A
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conclude by running our algorithm on several artificial datasets and report on the
results. We observe as much as 50% improvement in the outbreak sizes compared to
a random partitioning. Furthermore, we show that our model is fairly robust to eip
estimation error in that errors in eips lead to small changes in expected outbreak
size.
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Our results show that for diseases with high reproductive numbers (R0), very
small eips can lead to large outbreaks within sequestered population. This suggests
that to be effective, critical workers should be sequestered very early on during an
outbreak. The group sizes and the time to enforce sequestration are both impor-
tant logistically as well as socially – from a logistical standpoint, one would like to
keep the group sizes large, from a societal standpoint, one would like to sequester
individuals as late as possible. Our results, were based on a number of implicit
assumptions that are nevertheless defensible. First, we assume that individuals who
get infected are removed from the sequestered population in a predictable way. Re-
moval is possible only after the individual is symptomatic; in case of flu-like diseases,
this usually happens a couple of days after the individual is infectious. We incor-
porate this time into the transmission probability p. Second, we assume that eips
can be effectively estimated. eips capture the uncertainty inherent in this complex
process; the sensitivity studies reported in the experimental results section show
that our results are fairly robust. Third, we assume completely mixed groups with
uniform transmission probabilities. Again while not completely true it appears to
be a reasonable assumption for flu-like illness.
3.2.1 Preliminaries
We develop a combinatorial model for the sequestering problem in the rest
of this section. Let V denote a set of people (also referred to as nodes), who
need to be sequestered within a base that has k groups with sizes {m1, . . . , mk}.
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Figure 3.6: Here we see two partitions of a population into two groups each. The
nodes represent individuals and are labeled ”‘high”’ or ”‘low”’ based upon the per-
son’s eip. For this example think of ”‘high”’ being close to 1 and ”‘low”’ close
to 0. The edges represent random disease transmission paths. In these instances,
an outbreak spreads from any externally infected person to all others in the same
connected component. In the left example, the population is divided into groups
randomly. All but 4 people are connected to those who are likely infected. In the
right example, there is a low eip group and a high eip group. Here all 10 people in
the low eip group are likely to remain healthy.
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The goal is to partition V into groups V1, . . . , Vk, so that |Vi| ≤ mi. Naturally,
we need
∑
i mi ≥ |V | for a feasible solution. We are given an external infection
probability si for each i ∈ V , which means that node i is infected with probability
si. As discussed earlier, we assume that these probabilities have been estimated
through epidemic simulations and demographic analysis of the population. However,
other individual differences in how people respond to a disease are not as obvious
and may not be possible to determine until after the fact. Therefore we make the
simplifying assumptions that everyone has the same resistance characteristics, and
that external infections happen independently. Many of our results hold under the
weaker condition that within any group, individuals resistance characteristics are
all drawn from the same distribution, however the stricter assumption simplifies the
presentations.
We assume that the contact graph G[Vi] induced by the set Vi assigned to a
group is a clique, i.e., any pair of nodes u, v ∈ Vi come in contact, which is quite
reasonable for small groups. We assume the SIR model of disease transmission [91],
in which nodes are initially either Susceptible or Infectious. Each infected node u
spreads the disease to each susceptible neighbor v with probability p(u, v), and then
transitions into the Recovered state. For simplicity, we assume a uniform probability
p in most of this paper, though some of the results can be extended to the general
case. The spread of the disease stops when all the nodes are either susceptible or
recovered, i.e., there are no infectious nodes. The disease transmission process is
equivalent to “bond percolation” in the Erdős-Rényi random graph model, where
each edge is chosen with probability p [91]. Within a group formed by the set S
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of people, a random subset S ′ ⊆ S obtained by picking each node u ∈ S with
probability su is the initially infectious set, and the remaining nodes, S \ S ′ are
all susceptible. By the percolation process, the (random) set of nodes in S \ S ′
that become infected is the set of nodes reachable from S in the random subgraph
G(S, p). Let XS denote the final number of infections within this group. The goal
of the sequestering problem is to find a feasible partitioning V1, V2, . . . , Vk so that
the expected outbreak size
∑
iE[XVi ] is minimized.
3.2.2 An Efficient Algorithm for Sequestering
We now describe our main algorithm for optimal sequestering. As discussed
earlier, there are two natural contrasting heuristics for grouping people: (i) load-
balancing–type heuristics where we try and keep the total carrier probabilities ap-
proximately the same across the groups, which is usually well-achieved by a random
partitioning, and (ii) where people with high carrier probabilities are all grouped
together where possible: i.e., viewing the objective of number-of-infected-people as
something like a concave function. As mentioned earlier, the former heuristic can
lead to sub-optimal assignment, and our algorithm is based on a refinement of the
latter heuristic. We start with the following “well-ordered” property of an opti-
mal solution, and then discuss how this leads to a natural dynamic programming
algorithm.
A very useful property of the optimal assignment is that it is well-ordered,
which we define as follows: for any two groups G1 and G2 in a given solution, and
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people u, w ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2, if su < sv < sw then swapping either u and v or v
and w will not increase the final expected cost; this is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 For any two groups and a subset of the people to be assigned to these
two groups, there exists an optimal partition where all eips in one group are less
than or equal to all eips in the other.
Proof of Theorem 2 For any person a let Ia denote the probabilistic event that a
is externally infected (thus sa = Pr[Ia]). For any set of people S, define the random
variable XS to be the number of final infections among the people S. Similarly for
any set of people S, define YS = E[XS∪{a}|Ia]−E[XS∪{a}|Ia] where a is any person
not in S. Intuitively, YS is the expected marginal number of infections caused when
an additional person added to the group S is externally infected versus when the
additional person is not infected. Using the linearity of expectation we have that
E[XS∪{a}] = YSPr[Ia] + E[XS∪{a}|Ia]. This means that the net cost from swapping
a from a group with S for another person a′ from a group with S ′ is
E[XS∪{a′}] + E[XS′∪{a}]− E[XS∪{a}]−E[XS′∪{a′}] = (Pr[Ia′ ]− Pr[Ia])(YS − YS′).
There are two parts necessary to prove the theorem. The first is that if two
people a, b are in a group with additional people S, then Pr[Ia] ≤ Pr[Ib] implies
YS∪{a} ≥ YS∪{b}. We show this by conditioning on the connected components of the
group. Define random variable C to be a connected component decomposition (a
set of disjoint subsets whose union is the entire group) of a the group S ∪ {a, b}.






































































The second part is that in an optimal solution, if a and b are in different groups
along with Sa and Sb respectively, then Pr[Ia] < Pr[Ib] implies YSa ≥ YSb. This can
be seen easily because the cost of swapping a and b is (Pr[Ia]− Pr[Ib])(YSb − YSa).
If the original partition was optimal, the change in cost incurred by the swap must
be at least 0. Since by assumption Pr[Ia]−Pr[Ib] < 0, YSb−YSa cannot be positive.
Taken together these give that for any a, b, c with Pr[Ia] < Pr[Ib] < Pr[Ic]
with a and c in the same group with Sac others and b in a different group with Sb
in an optimal solution, YSac∪{a} ≥ YSac∪{c}. This follows because a and c are in the
same group and YSac∪{a} ≤ YSb ≤ YSac∪{c} because the group assignment is optimal.
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Since YSac∪{a} ≤ YSb ≤ YSac∪{c} ≤ YSac∪{a}, the three quantities must be equal and
any two of the three people can be swapped while keeping the cost optimal. Given
any optimal solution, as long as there exists such a, b, c we can continue making
these swaps, moving those with higher eips to the right, until an optimal solution
of the desired form is reached.
When there are more than two groups, applying Theorem 2 to all pairs of
groups yields the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Given any set of groups and a set of people with known eips,
there exists an optimal partition which orders the groups, and if group i comes before
group j than all of the eips in i are less than or equal to all of the eips in group j.
Theorem 2 tell us that an optimal solution keeps people with like eips together,
however it does not say when to stop filling one group and start on the next - this
can be determined by dynamic programming. We develop a dynamic programming
algorithm whose running-time and space bound are exponential in the number of
group-sizes r but polynomial in both the number of people and the total number
of groups. Our algorithm, which heavily exploits the symmetry of infectivities is
detailed in Figure 3.7 for the primary case in which all group capacities are uniform.
Algorithm Sequester requires the function g(S), which is the number of
infections if the set S forms a group. In Figure 3.8, we describe a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm to compute g(S); it can also be estimated arbitrarily well by
Monte-Carlo simulations. In fact, if the disease response characteristics are not
uniform across a population, exact calculations may not be feasible and such simu-
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lations may be necessary. The proof of optimality of Algorithm Sequester follows
from straightforward induction on the dynamic programming arrays which show
that it produces an optimal well-ordered partition and Theorem 2 and Corollary 3,
which show that an optimal well-ordered partition is an optimal partition.
Also, in Figure 3.7, Algorithm Sequester is described for the setting in which
all group sizes are uniform. This algorithm can be extended to handle r group types
(where a type i is given by a capacity mi and a value of p) by making OPT into an
r + 1 dimensional array and computing







[OPT (a−i, b1, . . . , bj−1, . . . , br)+g({a−i+1, . . . , a})].
Note that our analysis requires all of the direct transmission probabilities within
a group to be equal, but it does not require different groups to have the same
probabilities. Therefore Theorem 2 applies even when transmissions within one
group are more likely than those in another group. This may arise frequently as one
would expect different levels of sanitation, contact time, or symptom monitoring in
different locations.
An interesting feature of our algorithm is that it not only determines how to
optimally partition a critical subpopulation, but it can also be used to determine
when it is better to leave some critical individuals unsequestered where they will
presumably become infected. For example, if there is one group available for se-
questering, a single individual with a high eip, and many with low eip, then leaving
the high eip person out of the group can result in more of the critical population
remaining healthy. In this case the person who is a likely carrier is left behind to
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protect the rest of the critical population. We address this problem of incomplete
sequestering by adding an additional group where everyone assigned to that group
becomes infected. This new group represents those who are not sequestered. The
optimal partition produced by our algorithm for this modified instance, minus the
group where everyone becomes infected, is an optimal incomplete sequestering for
the original problem.
3.2.3 Experimental Analysis
In this section we examine the behavior of our algorithm when applied to a
few artificial datasets. We look at three specific aspects:
• How much better is an optimal solution than a random solution?
• How sensitive are our results to errors in the eip estimates?
• What is the time and space usage of an implementation in the C programming
language?
First we study how the eip estimates can be used by our algorithm. We
evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm, relative to a random assignment which
does not use the eip estimates, and find that the random assignment could lead
to outbreaks which are twice as large as our algorithm or larger. Next, we study
the sensitivity of our algorithm to the accuracy of the eip estimates, and find that
it is fairly robust. Thus, the eip estimates provide valuable information to policy
planners.
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In our study, we assume that a critical population (e.g., the military) is se-
questered at a base a few days after the onset of an outbreak of a simulated disease
in the general population. We assume that the eip estimates of such individuals are
known; and for our simulations we assume the eips are exponentially distributed.
For a given maximum group size, we find the optimal assignment using our algo-
rithm, and compare it with a random assignment. Figure 3.2.3 shows a histogram of
the ratio of an optimal solution to a random solution for a large number of simula-
tions using a variety of values for p and quantized exponential like distributions for
the eips. The optimal sequestering by our algorithm is up to 50% better than a ran-
dom sequestering, and often at least 25% better. We see the best improvements at
moderate disease transmission probabilities, and the worst at the extremes of low or
high transmission probabilities. This is because moderate transmission probabilities
permit the most room for improvement. With low enough probabilities, connected
components are very small, effectively isolating sick individuals from others in the
room. When probabilities are large enough, rooms become almost fully connected,
and most of the population falls ill despite our best efforts.
This sequestering scenario has an obvious susceptibility to errors in the eip
estimates. For example, if the eip estimates are no better than random, an opti-
mal sequestering with respect to those estimates would be essentially random with
respect to the true values. To examine the effect of estimation error we performed
a number of simulations where we found the optimal sequestering assignment for a
set of eips, and then compared that assignment’s cost to the cost of the same as-
signment but with the eips perturbed. The first way we perturbed the eips was to
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change each one by up to 30% while keeping the sum of the eips constant. This set
was designed to measure random, directionally symmetric errors. In all of our sim-
ulations the relative change (absolute value of perturbed minus optimal divided by
optimal) was at most .0012. This tells us that our assignments are very insensitive
to random, symmetric errors.
We also examine the effect of one sided estimation error. Using the same sets of
parameters from the symmetric case, we separately examine the effect of increasing
and decreasing the eips after an optimal assignment is made. When we increase all
of the eips by 30%, we see a maximum increase over the estimated values in the
expected infected set of at most 23.4% with an average increase of 8.7%. When we
decrease the eips by 30% we see a decrease in the expected infected set of at most
26% with an average decrease of 11%. While the 30% increase is an upper bound
(in general a factor of x bound on eip errors yields at most of factor of x bound
on epidemic size error because in any single connected component two nodes with
increases eips will partially cancel each others increase out), it is interesting to note
that in both cases the effect of one sided error is significantly less than the factor
of perturbation of the eips. A full plot of the scaling factors in our simulations is
presented in Figure 3.10. In summary, neither under nor over-estimating the eip
values has a compounding effect on our results, and symmetrical incorrect estimates
cancel out in practice. Therefore our sequestering scheme is fairly insensitive to
estimation errors.
We conclude this section by empirically showing some of the trade-offs in-
volved in an implementation of protective sequestering. Experiments in this section
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use EpiFast [14]. To establish the statistical properties of the system’s range of
behavior, an epidemic outbreak over a large population is simulated for each exper-
imental case for 50 iterations with identical conditions and different random seeds.
Infections within the essential subpopulation (≈ 188K individuals) are tallied for
each day of a 254-day epidemic. This gives us, for every day t, the distribution of the
number of infections within the socially essential subpopulation on that day. This
is used to estimate the epi for a given individual on any day t. We then simulate a
triggered decision to sequester the protected population on each successive day t and
compute the total number infected in that subpopulation during the entire epidemic
as a consequence of this decision. This amounts to a controlled representation of a
decision to trigger sequestering at that day. It allows us to establish the effects of
what different threshold triggers would be, had they been given a priori and used
by the authorities. Therefore we can experimentally compare in silico, the effects
of different triggers.
Next, we consider group size. Because the number of people in a sequestered
group defines the impact of sequestering an infectious person in that group, we
include a sweep of this factor in our experimental design. In the simulation, we se-
quester the protected population into group sizes of 30, 50, or 70. Transmissibility of
diseases vary, so the experimental design also factors person-to-person transmission
rates (defined as the probability per unit of contact time that an uninfected person
will catch the disease from a nearby infectious person) of 0.05 and 0.1. These values
correspond roughly to infection incidences of 2.52 ∗ 10−3 per hour over 20 and 40
hours respectively. To compute the number of infections if we start sequestering
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on day t, we run our optimal partition algorithm on the subpopulation given the
epis for that day. We then add the expected number of people infected within the
sequestered groups to the number infected before sequestering began. The results
are shown in Figure 3.11.
These results show that sequestering is most effective when triggered before
the disease has spread very much (when epis are low) and when the outbreaks
within groups are likely to be small (when the transmissibility times group size is
small). In fact, unless these two factors are kept small enough, sequestering may
lead to more infections within the critical subpopulation. These plots also suggest
a trade-off between group size and latent infection rate. We examine this trade-off
in greater detail in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.11 shows the effect of sequestering on a given day of an epidemic
and demonstrates that sequestering early can protect a subpopulation. However,
although there are implicit infection rates at the time of initiating the sequestering,
it does not show what happens when we start sequestering based only on a criterion
trigger threshold and surveillance measurement of the incidence of infection. Since
that is an inherent aspect of any real-world sequestering plan, here we extend the
analysis to this situation. In order to better understand a realistic setting, we sim-
ulate a number of scenarios varying group size, the sequestering trigger, the level
of vaccination, and the number of days each individual is placed in a “personal
quarantine” before being admitted to a group. The simulated vaccine is poorly
matched and reduces the chance of infection by only 30%. We trigger sequestering
based upon the rate of illness within the socially essential subpopulation being either
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0.5%, 1.0%, or 1.5%, (corresponding to days 89, 100, and 108 in the unvaccinated
base reference case). The main results are shown in Figure 3.13, where the labels
on the x-axis (size, trig, vax, and qd) refer to the size of the sequestered groups, the
levels of infection that triggered the sequestering, the proportion of the subpopula-
tion that was vaccinated, and the number of quarantine days prior to admission to
a sequestered group respectively.
Group sizes had the greatest impact, followed by the trigger threshold. Next is
the vaccination level, which is the only factor that affects the final attack rate when
the subpopulation is not sequestered. The least important factor was the number
of days of quarantine prior to placement within sequestered groups. The intra-
group transmission rates were calculated based upon a transmission probability of
2.52 ∗ 10−3 per hour of contact (when both individuals are unvaccinated) and an
average of 16 hours of contact time between when an individual becomes infectious,
and when they are diagnosed and removed from the population.
At one extreme, these results show that sequestering a subpopulation can effec-
tively protect them provided group sizes are small and sequestering is implemented
when only a few individuals in the subpopulation are infected. In our subpopula-
tion, using a sequestering group size of 30, with or without vaccination, and even
with the relatively late trigger, only a small number of individuals become infected.
This small group size limits the attack rate to an average of 15.6% across the 3 other
factors. For group sizes of 50, as long as sequestering is triggered before 1.5% of the
subpopulation is ill, sequestering remains an effective strategy (reducing attack rates
to an average of 17.9%). This remains true even when group sizes reach 70 if the
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sequestering is triggered early enough (at 0.05%, which occurs on average 11.7 days
earlier than 1%). This trend demonstrates how sequestering the socially essential
subpopulation with fewer latent infections reduces the number of outbreaks within
groups. Setting a lower trigger threshold for sequestering is the primary means
for accomplishing this, with temporary individual quarantining being another, less
effective and likely impractical technique. In our example subpopulation (without
individual quarantine), the only way to keep the total infection rate below 10%
involves sequestering at a threshold of 1% while maintaining group sizes of 50 or
smaller. At the other extreme, our results also show that under certain conditions
sequestering can be considerably worse than doing nothing. Having groups so large
that statistically most will contain latently infected individuals and/or transmis-
sion rates large enough to create outbreaks infecting nearly everyone in a group,
result in a large fraction of the sequestered subpopulation becoming infected. For
instance with group size 70 and triggering sequestering after 1.5% are ill, we observe
attack rates that are on average 15% higher (regardless of vaccination and quar-
antine) than if no sequestering had occurred. Waiting too long to commit to the
decision to sequester and investing too little in sequestering preparations will have
bad outcomes.
The results further suggest that we can group our containment strategies into
two categories: those that reduce the size of outbreaks within groups and those that
reduce the number of such outbreaks. Group size and vaccination level naturally fall
into the former category. The group size provides an upper bound on the size of an
outbreak (since an infection in one group cannot spread to another), but group size
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and person-to-person transmission rate have a more subtle effect as well. We know
from the seminal work of Erdős and Rényi [37] that when the product of group size
and transmission rate is less than one, these outbreaks tend to be small (no more
than O(log(group size))); when this product is greater than 1, the outbreaks tend
to approach the entire group size. This effect can be seen in our results since the
number of total infections stays small until the size-rate product approaches 1, at
which point many individuals start to become infected within their group.
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Algorithm Sequester
Given: set V = {1, . . . , n} of people, eips si for each i ∈ V , and k groups
of size at most m
Output : partition of V into groups of size at most m, so that the final
expected outbreak size is minimized.
1. Define OPT (a, b) to be the expected number of finally-infected people,
in an optimal solution for the problem restricted to the people indexed
{1, 2, . . . , a}, and using groups {1, 2, . . . , b} (for any a, b that satisfy
a ≤ mb). Let g(S) denote the expected number of infections if the
group of individuals S is put in one group.
2. Sort the people in V , such that i < j → si < sj.
3. For all b set OPT (0, b) = 0.
4. For b = 1, . . . , k and for a = 1, . . . , n, compute




[OPT (a− i, b− 1) + g({a− i+1, a− i+ 2, . . . , a})].
5. OPT (n, k) gives the expected infection size of an optimal sequester-
ing, and tracing back through OPT reveals the partitioning which
achieves that value.
Figure 3.7: Algorithm Sequester for the simplest setting in which all allowed
group capacities are uniform, though the final group sizes need not be uniform. The
algorithm is a dynamic program, based on the recursive expression for the optimum.
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Algorithm for computing g(S) exactly.
Given: set S ⊆ V forming a single group
Output : the expected number of infections, E[XS], in S.
1. Initialization the array P (j, x, y) to contain the probability that there
are x infected nodes at distance at most j from one of i initially infected
nodes, and y nodes at exactly distance j in a G(|S|, p) random graph.
2. Initialize P (0, i, i) = 1 and P (0, ∗, ∗) = 0 for all other entries.
3. For each j from 1 to |S|,









((1− p)z)ℓ−x(1− (1− p)z)y.




y=0 P (|S|, i, y).
4. Upon each invocation of g(S), compute A(i, j) – the probabilities that
there are i initial infections among the first j people.
5. A(0, 0) = 1, A(∗, 0) = 0 otherwise, and A(i, j) = A(i, j − 1) · (1− sj) +
A(i−1, j−1) ·sj . Computing A in this way computes values for several




Figure 3.8: Algorithm for computing g(S) exactly, though in practice a Monte-Carlo
estimate can be used.
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of optimal sequestering’s ratio of expected infection size over
that of random sequestering.
Figure 3.10: Outbreak scaling as a function of eip scaling.
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Effects of the Timing of Sequestering on Subpopulation Infection Rates
p = 0.05 p = 0.1
Figure 3.11: For every day of a simulated epidemic, these plots show the fraction
of the socially essential population that get sick during the epidemic, if we start
sequestering on that day. Group sizes of 20, 30, and 50 are shown, along with the
baseline case without sequestering. Transmissibilities on the left are p = 0.05 and
p = 0.1 on the right.
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Iso-Contours of Constant Protected Subpopulation Infection Rate
p = 0.05 p = 0.1
Figure 3.12: The contour lines indicate equal infection rates as group size and latent
infection rate vary. The key observation here is that the higher the latent infection
rate, the more important group sizing becomes. If we trigger sequestering late, we
can make up for it to a point, but only with significantly smaller group sizes or
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Figure 3.13: Effects of various interventions following sequestering. The proportion
of individuals infected in the non-sequestered population (blue diamonds) and se-
questered population (red dots) are plotted vs. which optional features are applied
to the sequestered group. The features are: the size of the sequestering group (size),
the threshold at which sequestering is triggered (trig), the proportion of subpopu-
lation vaccinated (vax), and the number of quarantined days following sequestering
(qd). These interventions are ordered by their impact on the final proportion in-
fected, size having the largest impact and qd the least.
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3.3 Random Edge Removal and Network Degree Sequence
In the previous two sections we developed and examined optimization algo-
rithms for fighting epidemics. In this section, we step back from that specific ap-
plication and focus on how random edge removals affect a more fundamental graph
property.
Many processes can cause the edges of a given graph G to fail independently,
say with identical probabilities. This classical idea captures the original random-
graph modelG(n, p) of Erdös & Rényi [36], with the host graphG being the complete
graph. This topic has received much attention recently in the case where the host
graph G is not complete, but comes from some interesting family of graphs. Motiva-
tions for studying random edge-removal are many: e.g., link failure in peer-to-peer
networks [98], instant-messaging or the fact that we can only sample (random) sub-
graphs of massive graphs [21], pruning of relationships in online social networks,
and disease propagation or network attacks [81].
Many properties such as diameter, emergence of the giant component, and
various spectral parameters (e.g., spectral gap, mixing, expansion) have been studied
when edge removal is conducted on graphs from various natural families [21, 36, 20,
19, 2]. Another natural parameter of a graph family is its degree sequence: indeed,
much work has focused on various properties of random graphs with given (expected)
degree sequences [22, 25, 24]. For instance, Chung & Lu [23] show how the size of
such a random graph’s likely giant-component depends on the average expected
degree and the second order average degree.
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The key role often played by the degree sequence leads us to the question:
what happens to the degree sequence of a graph family when edges are removed
independently with identical probabilities? If the initial graph has d(j) vertices










· pj−k(1− p)k expected nodes of final degree k. We provide a
characterization of how this new distribution relates to d for most interesting graph
families. We also provide concentration bounds that show that the degree sequence
matches the sequence d′ with high probability.
Let us start by discussing two basic types of degree sequences. It is known
that real-world, large-scale graphs often have a degree structure similar to power-law.
These graphs include the World Wide Web [10, 11, 68], internet routers [39], many
social networks including scientific co-authorship [9], as well as biological networks
such as protein-protein interaction graphs [101]. Some graphs previously identified
as being power-law may have degree sequences closer to stretched exponential, log-
normal, or other. For a thorough examination of many empirical datasets, see
Clauset et al. [26]. We will focus on power-law sequences as a concrete example,
and later show that the analysis works for essentially all other interesting sequences
as well.
Roughly, a power-law graph has many nodes with each low degree and a few
nodes with each high degree. A graph has a power-law structure if there exist
parameters α and γ such that for essentially all k the number of nodes of degree k
is ∼ αk−γ. To accommodate small deviations, we define a family of power-law-like
networks such that for some interval I of degrees, the number of nodes of degree
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k ∈ I is within a constant factor of power-law (i.e., Θ(αk−γ)). What happens to the
degree structure of the graph family when edges are removed independently, with
some probability p? Does a power-law-like graph remain power-law-like? If so, how
do its parameters vary, and how good is the concentration of the number of final
nodes with some degree k? What about graphs with exponential degree sequences,
where the degree sequence decays exponentially starting at some minimum degree
of interest?
Callaway et al. [17] address some of these questions using generating functions
to show how random edge removal affects the existence of the giant component
for original random graphs of arbitrary degree distribution. Martin et al. [81] is a
more direct predecessor of our work. They considered the special case of p = 1
2
and γ = 2 for power-law graphs, and derived empirical results demonstrating that
removing edges with probability 1
2
from a power-law graph gives an expected new
degree structure which is close to power-law. More recently Cooper and Lu [29] have
shown that only power-law distributions are “scale-free”, in the sense that a random
subgraph of a power-law graph is likely to be “scale-free” also. (Technically, the work
of [29] is on “site percolation”, wherein vertices are removed randomly, while those
of [17, 81] and ours are on “bond percolation”, wherein edges are removed. Because
our bounds for E[dk] rely on a sum over the expected contribution from each node
and every node not removed by site percolation has the same behavior as it does in
bond percolation, our qualitative statements about expected degree sequences apply
to the bond percolation context as well.)
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In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 we prove that after random edge removal power-
law-like networks retain expected degree sequences that are power-law-like with the
same value of γ. Then we go on to show how the value p changes the exponent in
exponential degree sequences. We get explicit, analytical bounds by algebraically
combining a binomial distribution, a step function, and the degree distribution.
These results are in contrast with the three works mentioned above, as follows. Given
the general generating-function bounds of [17], one needs to evaluate numerically
the parameters of interest, in some cases by iterated numerical evaluation. The
main results of [81] are largely empirical, and focus on the case where p = 1
2
and
γ = 2. Finally, the generating function based work of [29] requires that the graph
have bounded degree D, and that for all k ≤ D, the number of nodes of degree
k is precisely power-law up to a lower-order term: i.e., (c + o(1))nk−γ for some
constant c, whereas we allow a multiplicative-constant deviation from strict power-
law behavior. (We also improve upon [29] in a tail bound, as described below. Note,
however, that given a precise “(c+ o(1))nk−γ” bound as above, the elegant work of
[29] shows that only such degree sequences remain purely “scale-free” under edge
removal.)
In Section 3.3.3 we give a unified view of how degree distributions change with
edge removal. Specifically, for any general, non-increasing degree distribution where
d(j) nodes have degree j, the degree distribution after edge removal can be classified
based on the limit behavior of d(j)/d(j − 1). We study three main classes based
on whether limj→∞ d(j)/d(j − 1) exists and is bounded away from both 0 and 1,
approaches 1, or approaches 0. For d(j)/d(j − 1) bounded away from 0 and 1, the
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distribution is exponential and after edge removal the new distribution is a different
exponential; for d(j)/d(j − 1) approaching 0, the new distribution d′(k) is Θ((1 −
p)kd(k)); and for d(j)/d(j−1) approaching 1 quickly enough, the new distribution is
Θ(d(j)). This final result means that for almost any distribution of interest, random
edge-removal does not affect the distribution type, only the “scale” of the distribution.
Thus whether a network is power-law or has a similar distribution does not matter
(which is useful due to the subtleties in distinguishing such distributions [80, 86]),
and the relationship between the expected distribution in the new network and the
original distribution can be easily determined.
The above discussion focused on the expected number of nodes of degree k in
the graph after random edge removal, for an arbitrary but single value of k. How
well is the final degree sequence concentrated around this target? In Section 3.3.4,
we demonstrate a constant factor concentration, by a careful grouping of the vertices
and through Martingale inequalities. One further way in which we improve upon
[29] here is as follows: they require that the sum of the degrees-squared in the
original graph be O(n2−Ω(1)) for their tail-bounds to hold. We require something
much weaker than the analog of this for bond percolation. In Section 3.3.5 we
discuss the effect of edge removal on probabilistic degree distributions: in models
like those proposed by Chung and Lu [23] or Leskovec et al. [75] edges in a graph
are already specified probabilistically. Thus nodes do not have degrees until after a
graph is instantiated; instead they have expected degrees. We briefly define what it
means for such a graph to have a power-law or exponential distribution, and show
what effect edge-removals have on the distributions.
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Thus, this work conducts a systematic study of what happens to a fundamental
parameter of a graph, its degree sequence, under edge removal. The general flavor of
the results obtained is that for essentially all of the interval of degrees of interest, the
degree sequence retains its qualitative character, and several quantitative aspects as
well.
3.3.1 Graphs with Power-Law Degree Sequences
In this section we derive specific bounds for how a power-law-like degree se-
quence changes through independently random edge removal. Letting deg(v) denote
the degree of a node v, we define a graph with n vertices to be power-law-like with




In doing so, we develop the intuition and details which lead to the general catego-
rization presented later.
Define deg(v) to be the degree of any vertex v. Given any graph G that has a
power-law-like distribution on its node degrees we remove each edge independently
with probability p. We show for all degrees k in the range R = [dmin · (1− p), dmax ·
(1−p)], that there are an expected Θ(nk−γ) nodes of degree k in the new graph. The
size of the new graph’s power-law-like degree range is the original graph’s power law
range scaled down by a factor of 1−p. Note that this places an implicit limit on how
close p can be to 1 and still have a largely power-law new graph. If (1−p)(dmax−dmin)
is small then the range of degrees for which the power-law-like property holds will be
small as well. This makes intuitive sense because if p is small, only a few edges are
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removed and the graph should not change much. If p is close to one, then most edges
are removed, the graph changes drastically, power-law-like behavior only remains for
a small range of nodes.
We define the random variable dk to be the number of vertices with degree k






















This equation comes from taking a sum over all degrees j ≥ k of the number
of nodes with degree j times the probability that this node has degree k after the
edge removal. If the distribution is exactly power-law (c1 = c2 = c, dmin = 1, and







pj−k(1 − p)kcnj−γ, which is
commonly used elsewhere [81, 29, 28]. If c1 6= c2 then we can use c1 throughout and
introduce only a constant factor error term of c2
c1
which can be applied to the upper
bound at the end, so for the remainder of our analysis we assume that c1 = c2.
Based on (3.1) we define for all k ∈ R the functions gk and fk. Specifically we






pj−k(1− p)kc1nj−γ . (3.2)
We view gk(j) as the product of three separate functions. First is a step
function which is 1 when dmin ≤ j ≤ dmax and 0 otherwise. The second is a power-
law function giving the number of nodes of degree j: c1nj
−γ . Finally we have the
function that gives the probability of a node with degree j having final degree k.
The type of degree distribution only affects the second of these functions; the other
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E[dk] Step Function





Figure 3.14: Examples of the three functions which make up gk for k = 20, dmin =
60, dmax = 100, c1n = 10000, γ = 2, p = .75.
two are degree distribution independent. Examples of the three functions appear in
Figure 3.14.
The intuition behind our method comes in two parts. First, for any given
positive σ the third component function (which is almost a negative binomial prob-
ability distribution) has the vast majority of its mass (all but an amount exponential
in −σ) within an O(σ ·
√
k
1−p) range around j =
k
1−p . And second, that within this
range the value of j−γ does not change much.
We also define the function fk(j) for j ≥ k to be the ratio of successive terms
in the sum E[dk] such that
fk(j) = gk(j + 1)/gk(j) =
pjγ
(j + 1− k)(j + 1)γ−1 . (3.3)
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This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 4 ∀k > γ, the function fk(j) is strictly decreasing as j increases.
The proof proceeds by treating fk as a continuous function, and showing that
the derivative is always negative.




(j + 1− k)(j + 1)γ−1 −
pjγ ((j + 1)γ−1 + (j + 1− k)(γ − 1)(j + 1)γ−2)
(j + 1− k)2(j + 1)2γ−2
=
γpjγ−1(j + 1− k)(j + 1)γ−1 − pjγ(j + 1)γ−1 − pjγ(j + 1− k)(γ − 1)(j + 1)γ−2
(j + 1− k)2(j + 1)2γ−2
=
pjγ−1(j + 1)γ−2
(j + 1− k)2(j + 1)2γ−2 (γ(j + 1− k)(j + 1)− j(j + 1)− j(j + 1− k)(γ − 1)) .
(3.4)
The fractional part of (3.4) is strictly positive. Therefore f ′k(j) has the same sign as
γ(j + 1− k)(j + 1)− j(j + 1)− j(j + 1− k)(γ − 1)
= (j + 1− k)(γj + γ − γj + j)− j(j + 1) (3.5)
= (j + 1− k)γ − kj
≤ jγ − jk
< 0.
Since the derivative of fk(j) with respect to j is always negative when k > γ, fk(j)
always decreases as j increases.
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Using the fact that fk is strictly decreasing we next find the maximum value of
gk for all k > γ. When fk(j) ≥ 1, gk increases from j to j+1 and when fk(j) < 1, gk
decreases from j to j + 1. Therefore the maximum term jmax in (3.1) occurs within
one of where fk(j) crosses from above 1 to below 1. We treat fk(j) as a continuous
function and round to find the desired j:
1 = fk(j) =
pj





1− p (j/(j + 1))γ−1
. (3.6)
It immediately follows from (3.6) that jmax is always less than
k−1
1−p for any γ > 1,
which is inherent in a power-law distribution. Furthermore, since j ≥ k, j
j+1
is
typically close to 1, thus jmax is typically close to
k−1
1−p as well. This observation
drives our focus on j ≈ k
1−p from here on. Specifically we will use gk(
k
1−p) as a proxy
for the more elusive gk(jmax).
We proceed by showing bounds on gk(
k






















































· c1n · k−γ−.5 · ξ (3.8)







where λn ∈ [1/(12n+ 1), 1/(12n)].
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Next we use j = k/(1−p) as a starting point and bound how much gk changes
around this point. To that end we derive the bounds fk((k + σ
√
k)/(1 − p)) ≤
1 − ((1 − p)σ)/(p
√






1−p) ≤ epγ/(1−p)−|σ|/8 for both positive
and negative σ.








−γ−.5 with very small
error and that k
1−p is close to jmax. In this section we show bounds on how quickly
gk and fk change as j moves away from
k
1−p .


















real (positive or negative) σ such that σ > −p
√
k. We need these bounds to prove
that the overwhelming amount of the probability weight of nodes with final degree







































































































































































































































































term in (3.10) is greater than 1 when σ is negative, so it cannot simply














which is less than
epγ/(1−p), which only depends on the fixed parameters p and γ.
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pk − i(1− p)






































4p if σ > −2
√
k.
While our analysis runs into a discontinuity at σ = −2
√
k, this is unimportant.







k < k. Since there are no nodes with initial degree



















Since we have a dropoff in gk(j) from gk(
k
1−p) that is exponential in (j − k1−p)/
√
k,
almost all (at least 1 − O( 1
n






From here we use the bounds on fk((k + σ
√
k)/(1 − p)) to create a geomet-
ric series whose sum is a lower bound for the O(
√
k) terms of gk leading up to
gk(k/(1 − p)), which is itself a lower bound on E[dk]. We go on to use the bounds
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Figure 3.15: Figure (a) shows the function g40 with p = .75, γ = 2 and c1 = 1000 in
blue along with our upper and lower bounds for it. Figure (b) shows E[dk] for various
values of k along with our upper and lower bounds. With these parameters, the lower







1−p) directly to upper bound E[dk]. Figure 3.15 gives a graphical
illustration of our upper and lower bounds. This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Suppose we are given a fixed edge removal probability p and a power-
law-like graph G given by constants γ, c1, c2 and range dmin, dmax. The degree dis-
tribution of the induced graph where each edge in G is removed with probability p
is power-law-like as well. Specifically for all k in [dmin
1−p ,
dmax

























Proof of Theorem 5
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Our general technique to lower bound E[dk] is to lower bound gk(j) for the
√
k
values of j preceding k
1−p . We do this by taking gk(
k
1−p) and successively dividing it
by the intermediate k
1−p−j values of fk. From Eq (3.9) we know that these fk values
are not too large. The sum of these lower bounds, which we show to be Θ(c1nk
−γ),
is itself a lower bound on E[dk]. Figure 3.15 shows our upper and lower bounds for
both gk and E[dk].
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nearly identical steps. As long as dmax − dmin > 2
√
k there are always enough j
values either above or below k
1−p to contribute enough probability weight to this




Whenever k < γ we lose the guarantee that fk(j) is monotonically decreasing












pj+γ−k−γ(1− p)k+γc1n(j + γ)−γ
≥ gk+γ(j + γ).
Therefore E[dk] ≥ E[dk+γ]. So if E[dk+γ] ≥ αn(k + γ)−γ, then E[dk] also has

















closest to j in the direction towards k
1−p . This grouping is evident in the step-like
behavior of the upper bound on gk in Figure 3.15. We then bound a sum over all of























































































































































where the slack from (3.16) comes from Stirling’s approximation and (3.17) follows
because the preceding summation is less than 10.
Putting the two bounds from (3.14) and (3.17) together completes the proof.
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3.3.2 Exponential Degree Sequences
We follow up with a similar, though much more straightforward result for
graphs with exponential degree sequences. We say a graph has a γ exponential
degree sequence if there exist constants c1, c2 such that there are between c1nγ
k and
c2nγ
k nodes of degree k (for the analysis we use a single constant c1). If each edge
is removed with probability p, then the expected number of nodes with final degree








pj−k(1 − p)k. In the remainder of this section we prove
the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Given a graph with a γ exponential degree sequence and an edge re-
moval probability p such that 0 ≤ pγ < 1, the expected degree sequence for the
resulting graph is an γ(1−p)
1−pγ –exponential.
As with the power-law case, the terms in the summation can be broken into
three components: a step function, an exponential function, and a negative binomial.
However unlike the power-law case, the exponential function is significant enough
that the negative binomial does not dominate it, and the algebra becomes much





























This shows directly that E[dk] is exponential in k. Specifically the new graph
has a γ(1−p)
1−pγ exponential degree sequence. Note that this result does not require that
γ < 1, but only requires the weaker condition that pγ < 1. This restriction is in
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place because if pγ ≥ 1 then the new negative binomial term is no longer a valid
probability distribution.
3.3.3 General Principles
So far we have given two specific examples of what happens to a graph’s degree
distribution when edges are removed uniformly and independently at random. In
this section we expand upon those results by developing general asymptotic prin-
ciples that apply to almost any monotonically non-increasing degree distribution.
We look at any degree distribution given in terms of two parts, a unit step func-
tion s(j) which is one for all j between dmin and dmax and a density function d(j)
giving the number of nodes of degree j if s(j) = 1. These correspond to the first
and second components of the terms of gk, where the third component remains the













We classify most such distributions into three classes based upon the asymp-
totic behavior of d(j)
d(j−1) . The first class includes all exponential degree distributions.
When d(j) is exponential (d(j) = Θ(γj) for some γ) and limj→∞
d(j)
d(j−1) = γ for some
0 < γ < 1, we have already shown that the result is an expected distribution that







. The exponential case is unique in that
the pj term and the d(j) term align to produce a new negative binomial distribution,
plus a term exponential in k. The new negative binomial sums to a constant, leaving
behind only the new exponential term.
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). Here we have functions that decrease significantly
faster than any exponential. If a function d(j) decreases fast enough that asymp-
totically d(j)
d(j−1) ≤ ǫpj for some ǫ < 1, then for sufficiently large k,















The degree distribution decreases so rapidly in this case, that the number of nodes
with final degree k is dominated by the number of nodes with initial degree k. Thus
the distribution stays asymptotically the same.
Finally we consider the case where d(j)
d(j−1) = 1 ± o(
1−p√
j
)), which includes all
polynomial degree distributions, including power law distributions. In these cases,




j−k ≥ 1. Since
d(j)
d(j−1) ≈ 1, this occurs near j = k1−p , which maximizes the
negative binomial component function. Recall that the vast majority of the weight
in a negative binomial occurs within an O(
√
k
1−p) region around its maximum. For


































which for sufficiently large k is at most
(












Since for sufficiently large k, the value of d(j) changes by at most a factor of e within
the range for which the negative binomial component is large, we can approximate
d as a constant d(k/(1− p)) with at most a factor of error e. Thus for this category
of d(j) functions, E[dk] = cnΘ(d(
k
1−p)). This result holds for all power-law distribu-
tions, as well as any smooth, piece-wise combination of power-law functions, or any
other slowly changing function.
In each of these three cases, the effect of the s(j) step function on the summa-
tions is that of a range selector. Any k such that k
1−p falls well within the s(j) = 1
region will behave as described above. Any k with k
1−p is sufficiently far away from
where s(j) = 1 will have very small E[dk], with E[dk] transitioning slowly between
the two extremes.
3.3.4 Bounds on Large Deviations from Expected Degrees
In the previous section, we categorize how the expected degree sequence of a
graph changes when its edges are removed at random. In this section we take that
one step further and show that with probability at least 1− 1
n
, all relevant degrees k
will simultaneously have Θ(E[dk]) nodes of degree k in the resulting graph as long as
a few assumptions are met. The challenge in developing tail bounds comes from the
observation that every edge’s final degree is correlated with the final degrees of its
neighbors. This dependency not only means that Chernoff bounds do not apply, but
techniques requiring low degree dependency graphs are not sufficient either. Cooper





2 = O(n2−ǫ) for some positive ǫ, the probability that the
actual number of nodes with degree k after edge removal deviates from E[dk] by
more than a constant factor is something at most O(n−2) (they give a more specific
bound). We expand upon their technique, apply it to edge and not vertex removal,
and get improved results in several ways. In addition to requiring a bound on the
sum of the degrees squared, they reach their result by requiring the power law range
to include all degrees (thus not allowing graphs with dmin 6= 0 or dmax 6=∞) and the
number of nodes of degree k to grow linearly with n. We remove these requirements
and replace them with more generally applicable requirements. In this section we
will prove the following large deviation theorem:
Theorem 7 Suppose we are given an initial graph such that for some constants
c1, c2, and with probability at least 1 − O(n−4) for all relevant k, the nodes with
final degree k come from a set of size at most E[dk]c1
√
k lnn and with maximum
degree c2k(1 + lnn/
√
k). If each edge is removed independently with probability
p, then for all such k simultaneously, the final number dk of nodes of degree k




] with probability at least 1 − O( 1
n
). For this theorem,
we define all relevant k to mean those k ∈ [dmin(1 − p), dmax(1 − p)] such that
E[dk] ≥ 72c1c2k ln2 n(
√
k + lnn) or both E[dk] = Ω(lnn) and k = Ω(ln
4 n).
Remark. If we set c1 = 4/(1− p) and c2 = 1/(1− p), any power law graph satisfies
Theorem 7’s requirements. This includes power-law graphs that the Cooper-Lu
method does not apply to because of the edge density. To demonstrate how our
theorem applies to a concrete example, consider a power-law graph where nodes
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α gives the number of nodes in the graph. Solving for α gives α ≈ n/1.6, and thus
for k small enough, the expected number of nodes with final degree k is Θ(n/k2+ǫ).
Applying Theorem 7 shows us that the actual number of nodes of degree k will be
close to E[dk] roughly as long as either: (a) E[dk] ≥ 72c1c2k ln2 n(
√
k + lnn) which
leads to k = O(n1/3/ lnn); or (b) k = Ω(ln4 n), which for reasonably large n is
satisfied if E[dk] = Ω(lnn) and (a)’s conditions are not satisfied. (Ω(lnn) = E[dk]
is equivalent to lnn = O(n/k2+ǫ) and thus k = O((n/ lnn)1/(2+ǫ)).) These two cases
combine to show that our theorem covers most of the range of degrees k likely to
occur in the random graph. The only degrees likely to occur for which our tail
bounds do not apply are those where E[dk] < O(lnn). In these cases even if we
could directly apply Chernoff bounds to the large deviation probabilities, there are
simply not enough expected nodes of degree k to drive the probability of a bad
event below 1/n. Thus no scheme can be expected to improve significantly upon
our result in this particular example.
For the first step in our proof we take any arbitrary ordering on the edges and
consider the random process where the edges are exposed sequentially, each being
removed with probability p. For any vertex v, we can use Chernoff bounds to show
that at every step in the random process, if v has had x of its edges exposed, then less
than xp−4
√
x lnn or more than xp+4
√
x lnn of those edges will have been removed




)2/3) = 2 exp(−(16 lnn
3p
)) = O(n−5). If we
then take the union bound over all vertices and all time steps we have that with
probability at least 1 − O(n−3) for every vertex v and number of exposed edges x,
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between xp − 4
√
x lnn and xp + 4
√
x lnn of those edges will have been removed.
For the remainder of this section we condition upon this event, which occurs almost
certainly, and we concede the remaining O(n−3) fraction of instances as having large




deg(v) lnn ≤ k ≤ deg(v)(1− p) + 4
√
deg(v) lnn
can have final degree k. Note that this result immediately implies one of the condi-
tions for Theorem 7, namely that with high probability only nodes of initial degree
at most c2k(1 + lnn/
√
k) can end up with final degree k.
To prove our theorem, we also condition upon the high probability event that
for all relevant k, only nodes from the set (which is a precondition of Theorem 7) of
size at most E[dk]c1
√
k lnn might end up with final degree k. By the union bound
over all k individually, with probability at least 1− O(n−3) this will happen for all
k simultaneously. We condition on this almost certain event throughout the rest of
the argument.
For any such k, when E[dk] ≥ 72c1c2k ln2 n(
√
k + lnn), only E[dk]c1
√
k lnn
nodes are conditioned to possibly have final degree k, and each of these has at
most c2k(1 + lnn/
√






k)/2 edges internal to this set. Furthermore, each
edge we expose in our random process can affect at most two of these nodes (its
endpoints). Define the random variable X to be the expected number of nodes with
final degree k after exposing these internal edges. We can use Azuma’s inequality
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which says









≤ 2 exp(−2 lnn) = 2n−2.
Therefore, with high probability X ∈ [2
3
· E[dk], 43 · E[dk]]. After exposing
all of the internal edges, those nodes with external edges will not yet have their
degrees fixed because their external edges have not been exposed. By definition, each
external edge affects at most one relevant node. Therefore these remaining nodes end
up with degree k independently from each other, and thus we can apply Chernoff
bounds directly to exposing the external edges. Because X ≫ lnn, with high
probability the final result will be within a small constant factor of X . Specifically,
if the final number of nodes of degree k is Y :
Pr[|Y − E[dk]| > E[dk]/2] ≤ 2n−2 + Pr[|Y −X| ≥ E[dk]/6|X > 2E[dk]/3]
≤ 2n−2 + exp(−2E[dk]/3(1/4)2/3)
≤ 2n−2 + exp(−c1c2k1.5 ln2 n) = (2 + o(1))n−2.
For the second case of Theorem 7, when E[dk] = Ω(lnn) and k = Ω(ln
4 n),
once again for any k we have E[dk]c1
√
k lnn nodes which might end up with degree k.








of having final degree k. We divide this set of nodes into groups of size at most
k/(2 − 2p) (and at most k/(4 − 4p) unless there is only one group). We make this
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partition fairly uniformly, so that within each group G, the total expected number
of nodes of degree k within the group, denoted E[dGk ] is within a constant factor,
say 2, of every other group. The balls-and-bins model shows that even if we assign
the nodes to groups randomly, this will be satisfied. Thus each group will have an
E[dGk ] such that










Now consider the process where we arbitrarily order the internal edges, ex-
posing them one at a time, and once finished we expose all of the external edges
at once. How much can exposing one of the internal edges change E[dGk ]? For any
node v at any point in this process the internal edges already exposed are at most
half of its total edges. Thus for each internal edge and each of its two endpoints,
for some i: deg(v)/2 ≤ i ≤ deg(v) and i ≤ j, where i is the number of edges left
unexposed and j the number left to keep, the effect on the expectation of exposing





















































Because of the conditioning that at any point the number of edges removed r
is between xp− 4
√
x lnn and xp+4
√




This follows because i = deg(v)− x and j = k − (x− r), and thus
|j − i(1 − p)| = |k − x+ r − (deg(v)− x)(1− p)|





































Define XG and Y G to be the expected number of nodes in G of degree k after
exposing the internal and all edges respectively. If we look at any single such group
G in isolation and using the bound from (3.18) in applying Azuma’s inequality, we
get






≤ 2 exp(−E[dGk ]2/O(lnn)) = n−Ω(1).
After exposing the internal edges, we can expose all of the external edges at
random, and apply Chernoff bounds to show that the final Y G values will be very
close to XG. The analysis details are the same as in the first case of the theorem.
For n large enough, n−Ω(1) plus the large deviation bound from the external edges
is a small enough per group, that with probability at most n−2 any group will have
large deviation. As long as no group’s Y G has a large deviation from E[dGk ], the
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sum Y cannot have large deviation from E[dk] either. Since for each k the large
deviation probability of Y is at most O(1/n2), by taking a union bound over all such
k from 0 to n we see that the probability that any such k has a large deviation is
at most O(1/n). This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
3.3.5 Edge Removal on Probabilistic Degree Distributions
For completeness we also mention the effect of random edge removal on stochas-
tic graph models. Two such models are the Chung-Lu [23] and Kronecker [75] mod-
els. In the Chung-Lu model, every node v in a bipartite graph is parametrized
with an expected degree xv. The model includes each edge u, v with probability
proportional to xu · xv. The Kronecker graph model starts with a small initiator
adjacency matrix with entries between 0 and 1. A Kronecker product of two ma-
trices A and B each of size n by n gives a new n2 by n2 matrix where entry i, j is
A(⌈i/n⌉,⌈j/n⌉) ·B(i mod n,j mod n). A Kronecker power of the matrix gives a probabilistic
adjacency matrix from which graphs can be instantiated. In either case, each edge
has a probability with which it is independently placed in an instance of the graph.
We can sum the probabilities of all the edges incident on a node to get that node’s
expected degree.
In these, or any other, probabilistic graph models, we cannot used the def-
inition of a degree distribution d(j) for integers j giving the number of nodes of
degree j. We modify the definition slightly, to say a stochastic graph specification
has distribution d(j) if for all j the number of nodes with expected degrees in the
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For any d(j) such that d(j)
d(j−1) = 1−o(1), this yields E[dk] ≈ 11−p ·d(
j
1−p). For any expo-
nential distribution with d(j)
d(j−1) = c for some constant c, E[dk] = Θ(d(
j
1−p)). Mean-












1−γ−1 ≈ d(k/(1− p)).
In the case of an initial power-law distribution, the new distribution is also
power-law, and has the same parameter γ. Interestingly, exponential graphs behave
differently for stochastic and discrete models. In the discrete model, edge removal





The web has transformed into an interactive environment filled with billions
of pages of user-generated content. As with anything available online this content
may be accurate and useful, or it may be incorrect, misleading, or even criminally
deceptive. To evaluate the likely quality of such content, we naturally look at its
author. In this context trust (defined as the confidence that another will take or
has taken a beneficial action [48] becomes a critical issue. Note that trust is distinct
from reputation (which is often computed using a method similar to PageRank [93,
63]) because trust is personal and therefore relative to whoever is extending trust,
while reputation is an attribute relative to the community as a whole. Using trust
information we can help reduce risk in a commercial transaction [89], steer the
user to correct information [63], or in some cases find others who are similar to
oneself [104].
The immediate usefulness of trust is limited since any user only has information
about those who he knows directly. We overcome this limitation through trust
inference: the process of taking local trust judgments made by the individuals in the
network and extrapolated them to all pairs of individuals in the network. The most
natural method of trust inference involves asking one’s friends their opinion. For
large networks where most people are not connected by such short paths we require
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automated techniques. One of the earliest trust inference algorithms uses a recursive
variant on this idea [48]. Some early methods include network flow based models [78],
but the most prominent of which are variants on spreading activation [103]. These
models compute trusts from a single node at a time. They place an initial amount of
trust at the starting node. Then at each time step all nodes that have more than a
threshold of free trust on them keep some of it permanently and pass the remainder
evenly to its neighbors.
In Section 4.1 we present a novel interpretation of trust inference developed
jointly with Golbeck and Srinivasan [32] where direct trust is interpreted as an edge
probability. We then assume transitivity of trust and that all edges are independent.
It follows naturally that the probability of a path existing from one person to another
should correspond to the inferred trust between them. These paths can be viewed
as a chain of conditional probabilities. While path probabilities cannot be efficiently
computed exactly (the problem is #P-Complete), we approximate them closely by
repeatedly sampling the random graph as described in Section 2.
As discussed in detail in Section 2, the major advantage that this method
offers over existing trust inference algorithms is the creation of a path probability
metric space. This metric space (whether symmetric or asymmetric) provides a
basis upon which we can apply any one of the many algorithms designed for metric
spaces. Perhaps the most applicable of these are clustering algorithms which can be
used to identify groups of high trust within the network. We have shown that these
clusterings can be used to improve recommender system accuracy [33]. Another
benefit is the ability to quickly find important edges - those whose removal would
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make a significant difference in the graph or whose strengthening would greatly
increase the connectedness. These are edges with path probabilities very close to
the direct edge probability.
Most work on trust has dealt strictly with positive trust, where each new
path can only increase trust in the network. The idea of using both positive and
negative trust has been studied, and some philosophical ideas behind it have been
investigated [62]. However few quantitative methods have been proposed to deal
with this combination. Those that do address distrust as well as trust generally
propagate them both simultaneously where they can interfere and cancel each other
out [105].
Trust inference which incorporates distrust differs from positive-only trust in-
ference in several fundamental ways. Positive trust is naturally transitive – people
extend some trust to those whom their friends trust. The transitivity involved with
distrust is more complicated – what is my relationship to my enemy’s enemy? What
about paths with exactly one edge of distrust? Also, when edges are only positive,
there can be no disagreement. With distrust, positive paths can work against a
negative edge. Any good solution must address these problems.
To address negative trust information, we borrow the idea of a spring embed-
ding simulation from the graph layout literature. We start each node at a random
point in a geometric space and let positive edges attract their endpoints while neg-
ative edges repel theirs. This simulated system progresses until a cutoff threshold is
reached. The spring embedding method treats positive edges in a transitive man-
ner, and also balances conflicting information. Unfortunately, two nodes may end
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up very close together by chance if they are unconnected. We resolve this by us-
ing both the spring embedding distance and the estimated path probability to infer
trust between two nodes. We cover the details of our algorithm in Sections 4.2.
In many applications, we infer trust as an intermediate step towards partition-
ing a network into clusters. A good clustering has high trust or connectivity within
each cluster, and much lower trust between nodes in different clusters. In Section 4.3
we show how our spring embedding algorithm could in some circumstances recover
“ground truth” cluster information from a network. Specifically we create some syn-
thetic networks from 2-dimensional points drawn from well defined clusters. Then
our algorithm reconstructs the clusters present in the original, embedded data. In
Section 4.4 we develop approximation guarantees for a natural linear time clustering
algorithm. These guarantees apply to any situation where sample clusterings come
from any fixed probability distribution and we wish to find a one which is not too
far from the weighted center of this distribution. Thus even on massive networks we
can efficiently find a trust-based clustering to help with any number of applications.
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4.1 Random Graph Interpretation of Trust
Social networks on the web are a major phenomenon, with hundreds of popular
networks that have over a billion user-accounts between them [47]. This large corpus
of relationship information has the potential to transform the way intelligent systems
on the web are built. Knowing the social connections of a user allows the system to
utilize data from all their friends which, in turn, facilitates a better understanding of
the user’s preferences. The trust relationship is particularly powerful since it speaks
directly to the “quality” of a person and what they produce online. Social trust
extends beyond the connections between people in social networks; it can represent
the quality of a node in a P2P system or the performance of a web service.
In a large network, a given user likely knows only a small fraction of the
people with whom he or she will interact; thus, the user has no knowledge of how
trustworthy most people are. To use trust in this situation, methods are needed
for inferring trust between users who do not know one another directly. We present
a novel way of interpreting trust networks that leads to an immediate method for
computing implicit trust between all pairs of nodes, including those who have no
direct knowledge of each other’s trustworthiness. Our goal is to take the direct trust
values between individuals – values that the individuals themselves can compute
given local information – and use them to infer trust values between all pairs in
the population. Our approach also leads rigorously to a metric space among the
users, with closer pairs corresponding to higher trust-values; this naturally leads to
efficient algorithms for clustering the population.
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Our method is particularly interesting because the results of the inference are
not simply a best-guess at a trust value, but an implicit composite of trust and
confidence. In this context, confidence is a measure of how much certainty we have
in an inferred trust value based on factors like how much information the inference
is based on, how trustworthy the nodes are along the paths connecting nodes, etc.
Many algorithms which compute trust alone do not produce different results whether
following one path or multiple identical paths (e.g. [77, 63]). Trust estimates alone
do not account for how confident we are in the result of the algorithm. Rather, they
use a recommender system-type approach to estimate trust as closely as possible.
Our algorithm on the other hand, by requiring the direct trust information to be
pessimistic, includes both an estimate of trust and a confidence component. For
there to be a high degree of trust between two parties, either there must be a single
path with both high trust and high confidence, or many independent paths with
lower trust/confidence combinations. Each additional independent path increases
our confidence in the strength of an indirect connection, and lets us give a higher
rating. For many applications, an estimate that considers both components is very
useful; our method is well suited for these types of tasks.
We define tu,v to be the direct trust between u and v (which may or may not be
symmetric), and Tu,v to be our inferred trust value. While the tu,v may be arbitrary,
the inferred trust should obey the axioms in Table 4.1.
The idea that trust networks can be treated as random graphs drives our work.
For every pair (u, v), we place an edge between them with some probability that
depends on tu,v. We then infer trust between two people from the probability that
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Axioms of inferred Trust
Local Pessimism Since tu,v is a pessimistic estimate, indirect information can
only increase trust, thus Tu,v ≥ tu,v.
Bottleneck If all paths from u to v use (a, b), then Tu,v ≤ ta,b, and in
general the lower ta,b is, the lower Tu,v should be.
Identity Individuals should completely trust themselves: Tu,u = Tmax.
Complete Trust If there exists a path (a0, ai, . . . , an) such that for all i from
1 to n : tai−1,ai = Tmax, then Ta0,an = Tmax.
Monotonicity For any u, v such that Tu,v < Tmax, augmenting a graph with
a new trust path from u to v, or increasing a ta,b value along
an existing trust path should increase Tu,v.
No Trust For any u, v with no path from u to v, Tu,v = 0.
Table 4.1: Rules for any pessimistic system that derives inferred trust from direct
trust information.
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they are connected in the resulting graph. Formally we choose a mapping f from
trust value to [0, 1]. We then construct a random graph G in which each edge (u, v)
exists independently with probability f(tu,v). We then use this graph to generate
inferred trust values Tu,v such that f(Tu,v) equals the probability that there is a
path from u to v in the random graph. This model is one of many that satisfies our
trust axioms.
A very intuitive idea motivates this model. Consider the following scenario:
• Alice knows Bob and thinks he has an f(ta,b) chance of being trustworthy.
• Bob knows Eve and thinks she has an f(tb,e) chance of being trustworthy, and
he tells this to Alice if he is trustworthy. If Bob is not trustworthy, he may lie
about pe and give any value to Alice.
• Alice reasons that Eve is trustworthy if Bob is trustworthy and gives her the
correct value f(tb,e) and Eve is trustworthy with respect to Bob.
• This combination happens with probability f(ta,b)f(tb,e) = f(Ta,e) if Bob’s
trustworthiness and Eve’s trustworthiness are independent.
Thus we view a path through the network as a Bayesian chain. Define XBob
and XEve to be the respective random events that Bob and Eve are trustworthy
from Alice’s perspective. This is explained in more detail in Figure 4.1.
The same analysis can be used if trust is a proxy for similarity: Alice and
Bob’s mutual trust can be a measure of how similar they are. If trust is interpreted
as a probability of being in the same category, then Alice’s category is the same as
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Pr[XEve] = Pr[XEve|XBob] · Pr[XBob] + Pr[XEve|XBob] · Pr[XBob]
≥ Pr[XEve|XBob] · Pr[XBob].
Figure 4.1: Here Alice’s trust in Eve comes from Alice’s trust in Bob and Bob’s
trust in Eve. The second term drops out because Alice has no information about
Eve if Bob is not trustworthy. Furthermore, if Eve and Bob are independent, this
probability becomes Pr[XBob]Pr[XEve].
Eve’s if (but not necessarily only if) Alice and Bob share a category and Bob and
Eve share a category.
We employ large-deviation bounds to show how to quickly estimate trust be-
tween individuals even in very large, complex networks: those with exponentially
many, highly correlated paths between pairs of nodes. In these examples, the
Bayesian chain view still applies. If there exists a path from Alice to Eve in a
random network constructed from trust values, then that path is a chain of people
from Alice to Eve who each trust their successor, and Alice can trust Eve. Therefore
Alice trusts Eve with the probability that there is a path from Alice to Eve in the
random graph. Since it is inefficient to compute connectivity probabilities exactly,
we rely on random sampling. If the true connectivity probability between Alice and
Eve is p and we sample the graph k times, then kp of them will contain an Alice
to Eve path in expectation. We then apply Chernoff bounds which show that when
k is reasonably large, our sampled value will be very close to the actual value kp.
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In fact, for any ǫ > 0, if we take k = Θ( logn
ǫ2
) samples, then for any pair u, v the
probability that our estimate is off by more than ǫ is at most e−Θ(ǫ
2 logn/ǫ2) = n−Ω(1).
We then take a union bound over all pairs to bound the probability that any pair
deviates by more than ǫ. If we take as few as 5 logn/ǫ2 samples this probability
is at most n−3 for each pair. Taking a union bound over all pairs shows that with
probability at least 1− 1
n
, Tu,v will be within ǫ of the true value for every pair u, v
simultaneously.
Sampling can also take into account other hard to model factors. In all of our
experiments, edges in the random graphs are completely independent, however if
Alice has some information that either Bob or Eve is untrustworthy but she does
not know which one, she can build that into the random graph model. Thus anytime
there is an edge between Alice and Bob, there will not be one between Bob and Eve
and vice-versa.
In addition to having an intuitive motivation, our algorithm is also novel within
the area of trust inference in the extent to which it allows us to make use of estab-
lished algorithms in graph and clustering theory. Because of the graph-theoretic
nature of the algorithm, we can make use of the probabilistic method as well as the-
ory of random graphs pioneered by Erdös and Rényi [37] and heavily studied since
then. Additionally, because our algorithm defines a metric space on the people in
a trust network – as demonstrated in Section 4.1.2 – we obtain the flexibility and














Figure 4.2: This is an example network with a critical edge. No one from the set
{a, b, c} can trust anyone in {d, e, f} except through the mutual trust between c and
d.
4.1.1 Illustrative Examples
In this section we introduce a few small example graphs to demonstrate some
of the desirable qualities that our path probability formulation exhibits. In these
examples trust is symmetric, however it could just as easily be asymmetric.
In our first example, Figure 4.2, the graph consists of two cliques connected
by a single edge. Since any path from one clique to the other must include this
edge, the trust between any two nodes in different cliques is bounded by this edge’s
probability. This exemplifies the bottleneck property, which protects against an
adversary attempting to build unwarranted trust. Any group of adversaries can
only obtain as much trust as people already in the network are willing to extend to
them, regardless of how much they trust each other.
In our second example, Figure 4.3, we have a complete bipartite graph laid out
in a planar fashion. The nodes a and b have no direct trust between them, instead
they are connected through a sequence of common neighbors. If the trust between
neighbors is uniformly p, then each possible path connecting a and b occurs with
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Figure 4.3: This is an example network where many weak, direct connections yield
one strong, indirect connection. In this example, the path probability between a





probability p2. There are k neighbors between them, so there exists at least one such
path with probability 1− (1− p2)k ≈ 1− e−p2k. The path probability is exponential
in p2k and thus can be very close to 1 even when p is low. This case demonstrates
that a can trust b when there is a lot of independent, low-trust confirmation of b’s
trustworthiness. Intuitively this corresponds to Alice having lots of acquaintances
who also know a little about Eve’s trustworthiness. In this case either they all can
vouch for Eve a little bit. Thus collectively these paths provide a strong link from
a to b. Note that the path probability from a to c is not similarly magnified. Even
assuming that f(Ta,b) ≈ 1, the probability connecting a and c at most 2p−p2 which
does not increase toward 1 as k increases.
4.1.2 Additional Benefits
Recall that f(Tu,v) is the probability that a path connects u and v. This brings
us to our first theorem:
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Theorem 8 The function d(u, v) = log 1
f(Tu,v)
defines a metric space (or for asym-
metric trust, an asymmetric metric space) on the nodes as long as trust edges are
independent.
Proof:
For a function d to define a metric we require four conditions:
• d(u, v) ≥ 0
• d(u, v) = d(v, u) (this condition is not necessary for asymmetric metrics).
• d(u, u) = 0
• d(u, v) + d(v, w) ≥ d(u, w)
The first condition holds because logarithms of probabilities are always negative.
The second condition holds because T is symmetric. The third holds because every
node always has a path of length 0 to itself. The final condition holds because
any two paths in a random-graph are positively correlated. The event that there
is a path from u to v is monotonically increasing in the set of edges kept in the
graph – keeping an addition edge can only create additional paths. Therefore, by
the FKG inequality [41], the connectivity between u and v is positively correlated
with the connectivity between v and w. Finally a path from u to v and a path
from v to w implies a path from u to w. Because the existence of a path is a
monotone function of the edges kept, the FKG inequality [41] applies and the such
paths are positively correlated. This means that f(Tu,v) ·f(Tv,w) ≤ f(Tu,w) and thus
d(u, v) + d(v, w) ≥ d(u, w).
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Since we have a metric space on the nodes where the further apart two nodes
are, the lower the probability of a path between them, we can make use of exist-
ing metric clustering algorithms to partition the nodes into groups. A clustering
algorithm takes a set of points in a metric space and groups them in a way that
tries to optimize some criteria. Examples include, k-centers which finds a set of k
points S which minimizes the maximum distance from any point to its closest point
in S, k-means which partitions the points into k sets in a way that minimizes the
variance within each group, and correlation clustering which partitions the points
in a way that minimizes the sum of distances within groups minus the sum of dis-
tances across groups. Each of these clustering algorithms have good approximation
algorithms when applied to points in a symmetric metric space [56, 64, 8, 1], and
some even have good approximations in an asymmetric metric space [3]. Figure 4.4
contains examples of clusterings based upon this trust metric.
Another major analytical benefit of our algorithm involves the ease with which
key edges can be identified. A quick visual inspection of Figure 4.2 shows that the
edge (c, d) is in some sense critical in that removing it would drastically alter some of
the distances in the graph. Meanwhile the edge (a, b) has less importance, because
of the path (a, c, b). Our technique gives a simple, algorithmic way of detecting and
quantifying the importance of such edges.
For each trust edge, we define the criticality cu,v to be the difference between
the inferred trust Tu,v, and what the inferred trust would be if the edge (u, v)
did not exist, which we denote by T ′u,v. The criticality of an edge tells us how
important a direct relationship is, and is parallel to centrality measures for nodes.
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If an edge’s criticality is small, it means that it is redundant and we can lower it’s
weight without changing the overall graph distances much because there are other
likely paths around it. Conversely if the criticality cu,v is large, most of the paths
from node u to node v require the edge u, v.
One way of estimating criticality would involve for each edge, removing the
edge and simulating the graph some Θ( logn
ǫ2
) additional times. If E is the set of all
edges, this generates a total of Θ( |E| logn
ǫ2
) random graphs. However if we make use
of some probability theory, we only need to acquire one set of estimates on the Tu,v,
and we can directly compute corresponding T ′u,v values.
The edge (u, v) is included in the random graph with probability f(tu,v), we
denote this event by Eu,v. Eu,v is independent of the event that any other path from
u to v exists, which we denote by Pu→v. We can analytically compute the criticality
cu,v by:
f(Tu,v) = Pr[Eu,v ∨ Pu→v]
= Pr[Eu,v] + Pr[Pu→w ∧ Eu,v]
= f(tu,v) + f(T
′
u,v)(1− f(tu,v))












We consider both symmetric and asymmetric trust relationships. Both occur in
networks depending on the definition of trust for the application. In social networks
where trust is a social relationship between people, it is frequently asymmetric.
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This is easy to understand in certain relationships. For example, small children
have almost perfect trust in their parents while parents may have very little trust
in those children. The asymmetry in trust may also originate from asymmetric
knowledge. People may trust an expert while that expert often does not know the
people who trust her, and thus she has no trust in them.
However, in other cases, it is reasonable to assume trust is symmetric. This will
happen when trust is a measure of the quality of a mutual relationship or similarity,
rather than a measure of the quality of an individual node. For example, in a game
environment, trust may be a measure of the success two players have as a team.
Measured as a rate of success, this value will be symmetric.
4.1.3 Experimental Results
We used two social networks with trust values as test networks: the Trust
Project network [46] , a Semantic Web-based social network where users provide
general trust ratings for their connections, and the FilmTrust social network [44]
where users rate each others ability to recommend movies. In both networks, we
selected the the giant component and removed nodes with a degree of 1. This left
330 nodes with 1,059 edges in the FilmTrust network. In the Trust Project network,
we selected the 62 people with more than one connection in the largest connected
component in the dataset and 177 connections between them.
Both of these networks contain directed edges with asymmetric trust values.
For the purpose of our experiments, we worked with both the directed graph and
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with a version where we converted the networks to undirected graphs with symmetric
trust values. This is discussed further in section 4.1.4.
4.1.4 Symmetric Trust
Our datasets are inherently asymmetric, each trust value comes from one per-
son rating the other, not from some mutually agreed upon value. This poses a
problem: how to compute a single, mutual, and direct trust value from conflicting
directed trusts that does not distort the meaning of the data too much. In some
situations, this may not be possible, however with our datasets trust is similar to an
estimation of similarity, which should be approximately symmetric. We resolve the
issue of conflicting trust values by taking the average trust over the two directions.
Recall that our algorithm requires a mapping from surveyed trust values to
edge probabilities. We try to address two major issues with our choice of this
function:
• Our algorithm requires direct trust values to be pessimistic. Any nonzero trust
value tu,v should mean that u has a definitive reason to trust v. We suspect
that people in our datasets often use a value of 3 or 4 as a minimum rating,
and only use lower values when they have specific evidence another person is
untrustworthy. Conversely people are more inclined to grant high values of
trust, even when there is little evidence for it. This is evident from the fact
that our datasets contain very few small trust values, and many very high
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values. We compensate for this by taking a nonlinear mapping from trust
values to edge probabilities.
• Many people rate just a few others, while a small number of people rate many
others. Someone could become one of the most trusted nodes in the graph by
rating as many others as possible. Since the trust is taken to be symmetric,
assigning trust to someone else implicitly assigns trust from them as well. To
address this issue and not excessively reward those who rate many others, we
capped the amount of outgoing trust for any node at 5 times the maximum
amount of trust. The choice of 5 was fairly arbitrary, though the choice of a
small constant motivated by the work of Erdös and Rènyi which showed that
a random graph with more than one expected edge per node is likely to have
a giant component.
We show the largest component of our first dataset in Figure 4.4. We tried
many different mappings from trust to probabilities, and most yielded similar results.
Looking at the graphs and the metric distance grids, you can pick out some of the
natural groups. Specifically, there are three mostly red blocks (indicating high
mutual trust) along the diagonal in the grid. The first such block corresponds to
the left half of the graph, the next block corresponds to the top right chain in the
graph, and the third block to the bottom right grouping. Also note that the node
between blocks 2 and 3 is a focal node which connects the nodes in the top right to
those in the bottom right of the graph.
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Notice the effect that changing the trust to edge probability function has on
the distances. With the t/10 function, trust values of 10 lead to edges with unit
probability, which assures that two nodes are at the same location in the metric
space. Furthermore long chains of high trust, like the top right cluster, have a high
probability of being fully connected. With the function t/20 (where a trust of 10 is
less than complete trust) on the other hand, there is a low probability that such a
long chain will have its endpoints connected. Hence the top right chain no longer
appears as a separate cluster. Only regions with many independent connections
have low distance between all of their nodes. This effect is more pronounced at t/40
or smaller functions, however our clustering algorithms still pick out the two major
clusters. Interestingly enough, the top right chain disappears as a separate cluster
when we increase edge probabilities as well. When p =
√
t/10, the probability that
it is connected to the cluster below it becomes high enough that they appear as a
single cluster.
Next we examine the FilmTrust dataset. Figure 4.5 breaks down our results
similarly to the previous dataset. It is dominated by a single, highly connected
cluster. Yet our algorithm is still able to identify a few isolated groups, as well as




When trust is asymmetric, all of the same fundamentals apply. We can still
sample the random graph to estimate the probability that there is a path between
two nodes with the same provable error bounds. Taking the log of the multiplicative
inverse of these probabilities gives a metric (though now an asymmetric one) which
we can use to cluster the nodes. However there are significant differences.
• We need a much richer graph. In the symmetric case, a large connected com-
ponent is enough to make the problem interesting. However with asymmetric
trust, we can have a situation (such as the graph a → b ← c → d ← e . . .)
where there are no non-trivial paths. While a dense directed acyclic graph
might prove interesting, ideally a graph should be dense and contain multiple,
interdependent cycles to be interesting.
• In the symmetric case a person who rates everyone else, but whom no one else
has rated can become the most trusted node, so we find it useful to truncate
total outgoing trust. In the directed case, this is unnecessary.
Because of the first reasons above, the smaller dataset is not particularly inter-
esting, and we will not examine it in detail. It has only one small strongly connected
component as seen in the metric distance grid in Figure 4.6. The larger dataset has
much more interesting behavior. Figure 4.7 shows the results. The distance grid
shows one large mutually trusting group, as well as several progressively smaller
mutually trusting groups. The largest of the groups is trusted by a large portion of
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the network. The second largest group is well trusted by this largest group. Beyond
that, the plot where f(t) = t/15 brings out the most difference within the groups.
4.1.6 Applications of Clustered Networks
A clustering of a network is a partition of the nodes into meaningful groups.
Intuitively, a good clustering will identify groups of nodes that are more closely
connected than the graph as a whole, and where a node is more similar to the
other nodes in its cluster than to the nodes in other clusters. Naturally, the goal of
clustering our inferred trust network would be to partition the network such that
within each group there is high trust. There are many technical definitions of a
“good” clustering and there are many algorithms for each definition. We generally
use a correlation clustering algorithm that groups nodes by minimizing sum of the
distances withing groups and maximizing sum of the distances between groups.
This seems well suited to the trust domain, but, based on the particular needs of an
application, any clustering algorithm that works with a metric space can be applied
to the results from our algorithm.
Once a network has been clustered, there are a number of interesting appli-
cations. First, it is extremely useful for visualization. Visualizing large networks is
difficult, as is identification of important groups within them. A quick and efficient
clustering algorithm that groups similar, trusted individuals together can be used
to effectively display the network and support visual analysis.
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Understanding trust relationships in social networks can be used to build more
effective teams. In a social network, edges can represent collaborations between peo-
ple. The trust can come from users who assign values indicating their judgment of
their collaborator, or from more objective evaluations of the quality of the collabo-
ration. Once we infer trust and cluster the network, the clusters represent groups
of people who have a higher probability of trusting one another and working well
together.
Some applications utilize trust as a background for other operations. As one
example, consider trust-based recommender systems [44, 82, 92]. We show how
path-probability based trust inference can improve recommendation accuracy in [33].
Clusters can also help limit the search space and optimize the list of items shown to
users. Instead of considering information from the entire network, the system can
focus on ratings from users in the same trusted cluster. Another example is email
filtering with trust [49]. Instead of burdening the user with scores or other trust rat-
ings from users, clusters can be a quick way to classify messages as “trusted” when
they are from senders in the same cluster as the user. When the goal of the appli-
cation is to highlight items that are more important, clustering is a straightforward
method of classification that makes a quick first cut.
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Figure 4.4: In each column, the top row gives the direct trust to edge probability
function. The top figures show distances between all pairs of nodes. The distance
from node u to node v is given by the color from row u column v. The grid is
sorted based upon clustering first, them centrality (the sum of the distances to
other nodes). The middle figures show a clustering based on the trust metric. Edge
weights are proportional to trust strength., with thicker edges correspond to strong
trust. In the rightmost clustering, the red nodes are outliers, and not part of a single
cluster. The bottom figure is the key for the grids, distances increase linearly from
a distance of 0 at red to 10 or greater at violet.
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t/10 t/20 (t/10)2.5
Figure 4.5: Here we present our FilmTrust results in the same format as in Figure
4.4
Figure 4.6: The metric distance grid for the asymmetric view of the small dataset.
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t/10 t/15 1
Figure 4.7: Here we show the distance grids along with partitionings for the large
dataset with asymmetric trust. The rightmost grid is not probabilistic, but instead
shows the transitive closure of the edge set.
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4.2 Dealing with Distrust
When interacting with information or other users on the web, knowing who
to trust is important, but knowing who to distrust is often more useful. Distrust,
however, is much trickier to compute. While intuition and experimental evidence
indicates that trust is somewhat transitive (if Alice trusts Bob and Bob trust Chuck,
there is a good chance that Alice will trust Chuck, too), distrust is certainly not
transitive. If Alice distrusts Bob and Bob distrusts Chuck, Chuck may be closer
to Alice than Bob is, or he may be even further away. Thus, when we try to
propagate distrust through a network, questions about transitivity and how to deal
with conflicting information abound.
While there has been some work on distrust [52, 105], there is a significant gap
in the trust inference literature. Distrust information can be useful and plentiful
but there are relatively few algorithms to compute it. For example, explicit distrust
can distinguish between two factions who do not know each well from those that are
antagonistic. It can also expose subtleties in a trust network which are inexpressible
with positive trust alone.
In this research, we present a new, efficient algorithm for effectively computing
trust and distrust in web-based social networks. With three real world datasets that
include trust and distrust ratings from users, we conducted a series of experiments
that show we can achieve 80-90% overall accuracy in computing relationships hidden
in the original networks.
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Recent work on edge sign prediction by Leskovec, Huttenlocher, and Klein-
berg [72] is a direct predecessor of our work. They examine the same three networks
as we do with a localized view. To predict the sign of an edge they look at the
positive and negative edge counts of its endpoints, plus the number and type of
triads containing this edge. These local factors form a high dimensional space on
which they perform standard machine-learning techniques to determine how to pre-
dict the sign of unknown edges. From a theoretical perspective they interpret their
results through Heider’s balance theory [55], which states that unbalanced triads
(those with an odd number of negative edges) are unstable. Experimentally they
show good edge sign prediction results for all three datasets (accuracy rates between
80-90% over all edges), with better results on edges with a higher embeddedness -
those which are a part of a greater number of triads.
4.2.1 Dataset descriptions
We use three major social network datasets from the Stanford Large Network
Dataset Collection 1 to test our methods. These networks have both positive (trust)
and negative (distrust) edges which are unweighted, though our methods could easily
support weighted trust and distrust. A description of each of the three networks
follows:
• Wikipedia moderator elections - Wikipedia, the popular online encyclopedia
created by users, has a set of elected moderators who monitor the site for
1http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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quality and controversy and who help maintain it. These moderators receive
extra administrative privileges, and thus must be trusted by the community.
When a user requests administrator access, a public discussion page is set up
for users to discuss and vote on whether to admit the moderator. Positive
and negative votes are counted as positive and negative trust ratings. Note
that in this network, if a user is not ultimately voted in, they will not appear
in the graph. Thus, positive trust ratings (or positive votes) will be more
common in the graph. The data was pulled from the discussion pages in
January 2008 [73, 72]. It contains just over 7,000 nodes and 100,000 edges.
• Slashdot - This is a technology news site where users can rate each other as
friend or foe. We treat those as positive and negative trust ratings. The
dataset contains over 77,000 nodes and just under 900,000 edges. Use used
the version released in February 2009 [74].
• Epinions - This is product review site where users choose whether to trust or
not trust one another based on their ratings and reviews of products. The
network has over 75,000 nodes and 500,000 edges. The dataset was collected
and released in 2003 [95].
4.2.2 Algorithm and Methodology
We previously described a method for computing trust based on path proba-
bility in random graphs. For every pair (u, v), we place an edge between them with
some probability that depends on the direct trust value between them which we
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denote by tu,v. We then infer trust between two people from the probability that
they are connected in the resulting graphs. Formally we choose a mapping f from
trust value to probabilities. We then construct a random graph G in which each
edge (u, v) exists independently with probability f(tu,v). We then use this graph
to generate inferred trust values, Tu,v, such that f(Tu,v) equals the probability that
there is a path from u to v in the random graph. In addition to having an intuitive
appeal, we found this approach to work well in practice.
Distrust, however, is more complex. While trust can be considered transi-
tive, distrust is not. Additionally with only positive trust, there are no mathe-
matical inconsistencies in the data. When we incorporate distrust, there can be
paths which disagree. We propose using a modified graph layout algorithm to find
a low-dimensional embedding of the graph which tries to reconcile the conflicting
information and transitivity. We are inspired by spring embedding graph layout
algorithm [34]. This type of algorithm simulates the physics of springs in a 2D or
higher dimensional space. In the graph layout version, edges between nodes are
treated as springs that pull nodes together together, but reasonable space is main-
tained between nodes by making them repel one another. Nodes are randomly laid
out in an initial configuration, and the system iterates until a stable equilibrium is
reached or some short-circuit condition happens (maximum iterations, changes per
timestep below a threshold, etc).
Our first attempt to incorporate distrust resolves conflicting trust/distrust
information through a nonlinear optimization. We assume that all users’ trust es-
timates are noisy, and we want to find the true ones. In this model, positive trust
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corresponds to edge probabilities, while negative trust corresponds to upper bounds
on path probabilities. We then apply a cost function for each edge of the deviation
between the “true” value and the “measured” value. From there we find a globally
minimal cost solution which does not have any conflicting trust/distrust information
and infer trust from it. Unfortunately this technique scales very poorly.
This led us to develop a spring-embedding algorithm which we use in con-
junction with our path probabilities technique to infer trust. We compute path
probabilities using only positive edges. Independently, we use an iterative spring
embedding algorithm – where positive edges attract and negatives repel – to resolve
competing trust/distrust information. Note that in the face of positive trust only,
this results in all nodes very close to each other which provides no meaningful infor-
mation. A spring-embedding algorithm implicitly has the transitivity and conflict
resolution properties we desire as well as the scalability necessary to handle very
large datasets.
We adapt the spring embedding algorithms to our trust systems. Instead of
having all nodes repel, we add a repelling force between nodes connected with a
negative edge. Trust maintains transitivity here because two nodes with a shared
friend are both pulled towards that friend. If they share two friends who are co-
located, they are pulled with twice as much force. If they have a shared enemy, they
are both pushed away (which may or may not move them in the same direction). If
one is friends with an enemy of the other, the forces will push them into different
locations. This modified spring-embedding algorithm also deals well with conflicting
information. If node A has two friends who disagree about node B, the friends will
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be pushed apart, and A will be partially pulled towards and partially pushed away
from B.
One potential drawback is that two nodes may be placed close together by
chance though they have little trust between them. This is why spring embedding
alone is not enough - we need to consider path probabilities as well. This combined
approach forms the basis of our new method. We can independently compute path
probabilities and spring embedding distances for our entire graph. For each edge or
potential edge, we record the path probability between its endpoints as well as their
embedded distance. Thus each edge corresponds to a two dimensional vector whose
position indicates the amount of trust between its endpoints.
To assess our algorithm’s quality, we apply it to the edge sign prediction
problem. For each of our three datasets, we remove a substantial number of edges
(500 in Wikipedia and Slashdot, 1000 in Epinions) chosen uniformly at random.
The removed edges make up the testing set and the kept edges make up the training
set.
Using the training set with the test edges removed, we perform parameter
tuning and compute path probabilities and spring embedding distances. For the
path probability algorithm, this tuning consists of choosing a probability p that
corresponds to a positive edge. In all three datasets we settled on p = 0.05, which
gives path probabilities for the edge’s endpoints spread across the range [0, 1]. For
the spring embedding algorithm, tuning means selecting the force functions for both
positive and negative edges and choosing the dimensions of the embedding space.
We found that an attractive force proportional to r2 and repelling force proportional
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to 1/r2 gave good distributions of points, and we chose the four dimensional unit
cube for our embedding space. For every edge in the training and test sets we then
record its sign as well as its endpoint path probability and embedded distance.
We bucket the list of training edges into intervals based upon their path prob-
ability, and for each interval we find the embedded distance which minimizes the
maximum of the ratio of mislabeled positive edges and the ratio of mislabeled neg-
ative edges.
We then use these values to classify edges in the testing set. For every edge in
the testing set, we find the interval that corresponds to their path probability. If they
are embedded closer than that interval’s cutoff, we guess that they are positively
connected, and if they are embedded further than the cutoff, we guess that their edge
is negative. Note that all of these test networks are biased with many more positive
than negative edges. Therefore our goal is not simply to have the highest ratio of
correctly classified edges, but rather to correctly classify both positive and negative
edges simultaneously. On such a biased dataset an algorithm which classifies edges
randomly could perform quite well overall (by simply always choosing the dominant
category), however the better it did on the positive edges, the worse it would do on
the negatives.
4.2.3 Results
We ran our algorithm over all three datasets. For each, we computed a sep-
arator to classify positive and negative trust relationships. This is shown as a red
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Figure 4.8: The positive and negative edges with the classification line for all three
datasets. Each point in the figures corresponds to an edge in the graph. The
horizontal axis is the path probability (larger values mean endpoints that are closer)
and the vertical axis shows the embedded distance (smaller values mean endpoints
that are closer). Points below the classification line are positive edges (or classified
as such) and those above are negative. For clarity in viewing the larger datasets,




Positive edges 0.78 0.77 0.85
Negative edges 0.22 0.23 0.15
Training edges correctly classified 0.86 0.92 0.94
Positive test edges correctly classified 0.81 0.81 0.89
Negative test edges correctly classified 0.78 0.84 0.89
Correct positive classifications 0.93 0.94 0.98
Correct negative classifications 0.51 0.60 0.61
Total edges correctly classified 0.80 0.82 0.89
Table 4.2: The fraction of correct classifications for various criteria.
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line in the charts of Figure 4.8. Positive edges are correctly classified when they are
below the line and negative edges are correct when they are above the line. Note
that the noisy nature of the datasets means that we are not able to correctly classify
all the edges in our training sets. The first two columns of Figure 4.8 show that there
are a number of points that appear on the wrong side of the line. Table 1 provides
the actual percentages; we are able to correctly classify between roughly 85-92% of
both positive and negative edges in the training set. This gives us a baseline against
which we can compare our results from the test set.
The third and fourth columns of Figure 4.8 show the data points for the test
set, and the results are detailed in Table 1. We achieve good results in classifying
trust edges, with approximately 80% of the edges in each category being predicted
correctly.
However, our performance if more skewed when viewed in the context of con-
fidence in our predictions. When our classifier predicts a positive edge, we are
quite certain (over 90%) sure of the results. However our confidence in a negative
prediction is between 50-60%. This bias comes from the fact that the dataset is
unbalanced, with many more positive edges than negative, and may be inherent in
the problem.
4.2.4 Discussion
Our results exhibit good self-consistency by performing well with respect to
our classifier. Overall, the results are generally quite good, and compare well with
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[72] which uses more, but all fairly local, pieces of information to make the same kind
of predictions. Our approach achieves a similar level of accuracy with a more holistic
approach, one that reduces the complex interdependencies in the network into two
related inferred trust values rather than a high dimensional vector of properties.
Furthermore, [72] notes poorer results with edges which contribute to few or no
triads. While this is expected in general (nodes with less direct information about
their relationship should be harder to classify), our approach does a better job of
using the information that is available in these cases - those trust paths of length
greater than two.
At a higher level, the fact that we are able to achieve these good results speaks
to the suitability of trust inference algorithms in general. Trust is a complex social
relationship, and we are using realistic datasets with trust edges created by real
users. It is not unreasonable to question whether or not trust can be accurately
inferred at all, since it is so fuzzy and personal, or to question whether our prob-
abilistic treatment is a proper one. Furthermore, distrust adds a new and difficult
element; how to properly treat it is an open question within the trust community.
The fact that we were able to classify trust as positive or negative with such a
high rate of success means not only that our algorithms work well, but that the
underlying data is compatible with our treatment of inferred trust.
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4.3 Cluster Reconstruction
Often when we invoke a trust inference algorithm, we want to cluster the
network’s users in some meaningful way. The fact that we can use inferred trust
distances to improve recommendation accuracy [33] and predict the signs of hidden
edges suggests that the clusters produced are in some sense “good”. However, good
results do not necessarily mean that our clusterings correspond to some natural
partition of the data. In a real social network, people can self-organize into groups
based on organizational memberships, geography, shared interests, political ideology,
etc. Can our trust inference algorithms find such clusters, assuming that they even
exist?
Unfortunately, as of this writing we have not found any rich social network data
with trust scores and well defined clusterings, though we are currently evaluating a
candidate network. In order to study how well and under what conditions we can
reconstruct a cluster, we generate several synthetic networks with various parameters
and attempt to reconstruct their underlying clusters. We do not claim that these
networks closely resemble real social networks. Rather our work in this section is a
proof-of-concept.
Since we focus on cluster reconstruction, we must start with well defined clus-
ters. We model each cluster as a 2-dimensional Gaussian and randomly sample
points from its distribution. This gives us a series of points, each of which belongs
to a well defined cluster with a 2-dimensional embedding. We then create edges
between these points in two ways. Every node gets some number of positive edges
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chosen uniformly at random into its own cluster. We also create edges where two
endpoints are chosen uniformly at random, and we randomly assign the edge to be
positive or negative. For each of these edges, the further apart its endpoints, the
more likely it is to be negative.
In each test in this section, we create three or four partially overlapping Gaus-
sian clusters. We experiment with several different centers and standard deviations,
including some clusters with standard deviations much higher than the distance
between their centers. For some c ∈ [1, 2] we give each node c expected outgoing
positive edges to other nodes in the same cluster, and 1 expected outgoing edge to
a random node in the entire dataset.
We show the results from each of our three synthetic datasets in Figures 4.9,
4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14. These figures show the initial distribution of points,
the average number of intra-cluster out edges generated, and a histogram showing
edge distances for positive and negative edges (blue and magenta respectively). Then
for a few sets of algorithm parameters we show the result of spring embedding,
a scatter plot showing how the distances in the original dataset compare to the
reconstructed distances, and the correlation between those distances. We obtain
correlations and the associated plots by randomly sampling 1000 pairs of points






From a visual inspection we can tell that our algorithm does a good job at
finding the clusters from the original datapoints. As long as c is high enough (which
appears to be 1 or slightly higher) our spring embedding algorithm separates the
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points largely into their original clusters. When c = 1.4, it often produces results
which are better separated than the clusters in the original graph. We can also see
that tuning the spring embedding parameters has a substantial effect on the final
points, but a small effect on the resulting clusters. Parameters favoring attractive
forces tend to produce fuzzier cluster boundaries. Those that favor repellent forces
produce sharper boundaries, but nodes with neighbors in different clusters stand
out more.
While our algorithm appears to do well at clustering, it performs only moder-
ately well at distance reconstruction. The correlations between the original distances
and the reconstructed distances in our examples varies from less than .1 to almost .5.
We do not view this as a drawback. Two points very close together in the original
embedding are not much more likely to be connected by a short positive path than
two points from the same cluster with are far apart. Since our algorithm takes as
input only the graph and not the original points, it has no way to infer that these
points should be especially close. In fact, the mean correlation between points from
different clusters explains much of the total correlation in distances.
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Exactly one outgoing, positive, intra-cluster edge per node.
Original Points Pos/Neg edge distances
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Figure 4.9: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our first set of generated
points. The points come from three Gaussian distributions which overlap slightly
with each other. Each cluster has its own color which we use consistently throughout
the plots. We show the original points, a histogram of how many positive and
negative edges have any given endpoint distance, reconstructed points, a scatter plot
showing how original distances relate to reconstructed distances, and the correlation
between original and reconstructed distances. In the first row, positive and negative
edges produce forces that are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively. In the second row they
are O(d) and O(d−2).
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In expectation c = 1.4 outgoing, positive, intra-cluster edges per node.
Original Points Pos/Neg edge distances
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Figure 4.10: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our first set of generated
points, but using more intra-cluster edges than Figure 4.9. Positive and negative
edges produce forces that are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively.
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Figure 4.11: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our second set of gen-
erated points. The points come from four equally spaced Gaussian distributions
which overlap slightly with each other. In the first row, positive and negative edges
produce forces that are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively. In the second row they are
O(d2) and O(d−3).
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In expectation c = 1.4 outgoing, positive, intra-cluster edges per node.
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Figure 4.12: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our second set of gen-
erated points, but using more intra-cluster edges than Figure 4.11. Positive and
negative edges produce forces that are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively.
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Figure 4.13: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our third set of generated
points. The points come from four very closely spaced Gaussian distributions which
overlap significantly. In the first row, positive and negative edges produce forces that
are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively. In the second row they are O(d2) and O(d−3).
Notice that our reconstructed points do not approximate the pairwise distances in
the original graph, however it prominently separates the clusters even when no such
separation existed originally.
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Figure 4.14: Here we show cluster reconstruction results for our third set of generated
points, but using more intra-cluster edges than Figure 4.13. Positive and negative
edges produce forces that are O(d) and O(d−1) respectively in the first row, and
O(d) and O(d−2) respectively for the second.
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4.4 Clustering Using Only Black Box Sampling
Clustering is an important challenge in the context of trust inference. All the
applications discussed above: recommender systems, team formation, visualization,
and many more benefit from finding groups which are tightly connected internally,
and loosely connected to the remaining network. When working with internet-scale
networks, even the most efficient clustering algorithms are space and time intensive.
Motivated by these applications, as well as those unrelated to trust, our research
addresses the issue of clustering the vertices in graphs in the most efficient possible
way.
Here we present a new method for graph clustering that clusters any set from
which we can sample random partitions. Our algorithm is computationally efficient
- it needs only a single pass over the network. This algorithm defines a distance
function between any two clusterings and attempts to find a clustering C where
the expected distance between C and a randomly sampled clustering is small. We
develop an approximation algorithm to find good clusterings in expectation directly
by sampling the random graph only once. We then show that repeated sampling
improves our confidence in the result. In Section 4.4.1 we formalize the problem
and prove that a single random sample gives a 3-approximation in expectation. In
Section 4.4.2 we show how to use multiple samples to improve on our probabilistic
guarantees. Finally in Section 4.4.3 we apply our new algorithm to trust inference
clustering as a demonstration of its usefulness.
137
Recommender systems are a common application and inferred trust values can
be used in place of traditional user similarity measures to compute recommendations
(e.g. [92, 5, 50]). In [42], the authors present a technique for using trust to estimate
the truth of information that is presented, which in turn has applications for assess-
ing information quality, particularly on the Semantic Web. Other applications of
that idea include using trust for semantic web service composition [71].
Often these algorithms require, as an intermediate step, finding clusters of
people who are more tightly connected to each other than to the remainder of the
population [96, 33]. The art of finding useful sets of clusters has been well studied on
a wide range of applications. In some cases there is some (unknown) “ground-truth”
clustering inherent in the data which we want to find, and the algorithms attempt
to find a clustering that is “close” to the true one [30, 7]. Often though, there
is no reason to believe that the data has inherently correct clusters, and the goal
becomes simply to produce a clustering which works well in practice for a particular
application.
When each data point to be clustered consists of a vector of numerical values,
one common technique involves choosing a distance function between the elements
(Euclidean, L1-norm, etc.) and looking for clusters which minimize some optimiza-
tion function. Examples of these algorithms include k-means [53] (which minimizes
the mean squared-distance of elements from their cluster centers), and k-centers [56]
(which minimizes the maximum distance from any point to the center of a cluster).
Typically approximation algorithms, which find solutions close to optimal, are used
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because it is impractical to compute the optimal clustering for these problems. For
a more extensive overview of various clustering algorithms, see [102].
4.4.1 The Algorithm
In our path-probability based trust framework, direct trust corresponds to
an edge probability and indirect trust between any two people in the network cor-
responds to the probability that there is a path between them. Using our path-
probability metric space we can apply various well-studied clustering algorithms to
the resulting distances. In order to have confidence in our path probability estimates
are accurate to within a tolerance of ±δ, O( logn
δ2
) samples are needed on a network
with n people. This poses a major drawback on internet-scale datasets, which can
easily have millions of users.
However there is nothing inherent in clustering which requires computing dis-
tances. In the context symmetric trust, we present a computationally efficient clus-
tering algorithm. Our new clustering algorithm algorithm takes a single sample of
the random graph and uses its connected component decomposition as the cluster-
ing. Sampling the graph and computing the connected components can be done
simultaneously in a single pass over the edges of the graph using depth first search,
and thus is as fast of an algorithm as we can hope for.
Of course a fast algorithm that produces poor clusters would not be useful.
Thus our main result is to derive probabilistic bounds on the quality of the resulting
clusterings. We start by defining a distance function between clusterings with the
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goal of minimizing the distance between our chosen clustering and a connected
component decomposition of an instance of the random graph. We do not expect to
be able to find the best such clustering (and in the general case where sample clusters
come not from a random graph but from a black box it is not possible), however our
single sample algorithm achieves a 3-approximation in expectation. This means that
a random clustering will, on average, produce distances no more than 3 times those
produced by the best clustering. We also show that using a closely related distance
function (one used by Balcan et al. [7]) our algorithm achieves a 2-approximation
in expectation. Finally we show how to achieve improved probabilistic bounds by
sampling multiple times instead of only once.
Consider the following problem:
• A clustering of a set U is a set C of subsets of U such that ∀x ∈ U, |{s ∈
C : x ∈ s}| = 1. In other words, a clustering is a set of disjoint subsets
whose union is the entire set U . For convenience we let a clustering contain
an arbitrary number of distinct empty sets.
• Given a set U , and a probability distribution P on clusterings of U , we want
to find a clustering X which minimizes the expected distances between X and
a random clustering drawn from P.
• There are many possible distance functions between clusterings, we will con-
centrate on the following one: for two clusterings X and Y , define DX(Y ) to
be minf :Y→X
∑
s∈Y |s∪ f(s)|− |s∩ f(s)|. In other words, for each set in Y , we
match it to the set in X which minimizes the size of the symmetric difference
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between the two. We will later consider a similar distance function proposed
by Balcan et al. [7]. They let the distance between two clusters be the mini-
mum number of elements not in the matched clusters under any matching of
the clusters. For any two clusters, the distance using our metric is at least the
distance using theirs, and at most twice the distance using theirs.
Note that while we do not restrict the function f , the optimal choices for f
are bijections (when we include an appropriate number of empty sets in the two
clusterings). This follows from the observation that for any optimal f , and for all
s ∈ X , s ∩ f(s) is at least half the size of both s and f(s). Otherwise it would
be better to map s to the empty set. Since no two distinct s1, s2 ∈ X can both
share more than half of the elements of a single y ∈ Y , f must be one-to-one. By
mapping extra, distinct empty sets onto the remaining sets in Y (if any), f becomes
a bijections.
For any given probability distribution on clusterings P (such as the one given
by the connected component decomposition of a random graph), define random
variable Y to be a clustering drawn from that distribution. Let C be a cluster-
ing that minimizes the expectation of DC(Y ). Since the distribution P is a black
box in general, we cannot hope to find the actual clustering C even with arbi-
trary running-time (because we can not distinguish between two distributions with
complete certainty). However the following simple algorithm surprisingly gives a
3-approximation in expectation:
Take a random sample C ′ from P, and use that as the approximation.
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The analysis proceeds as follows:
Let U,P, and C be given. Define gX(u) to be the set s in the clustering X
that contains u and fYX to be the best function mapping clusters in Y to clusters in






























0 fYC (gY (u)) = gC(u)





















Each element u adds to the total cost only if its set in Y does not map to its
set in C. In that case it costs 1 because of the mapping from gY (u) to f
Y
C (gY (u)),
and it costs another 1 if some non-empty set in Y maps to gC(u).
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0 fYC′(gY (u)) = gC′(u)
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Where Equation 4.2 maps s ∈ Y to s′ ∈ C ′ if and only if they both map to the
same subset in C. This mapping must cost at least as much as the optimal mapping
fYC′ . Dividing Equation 4.3 by Equation 4.1 gives E[DC′(Y )/DC(Y )] ≤ 3.
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We demonstrate that this upper bound is tight with the following distribution
on clusterings:
Pr[Y = {{1}, {2}}] = (k − 1)/k, Pr[Y = {{1, 2}}] = 1/k.
The optimal solution simply matches the high probability case, C = {{1}, {2}}.
The expected cost of this solution is ((k − 1) · 0 + 1 · 1)/k. The expected cost of
using a random sample is

















which reduces to 3 · k−1
k2
, and thus approaches 3 times optimal as k →∞.
We briefly consider the case where we change the distance function between
clusterings to
DC(Y ) = min
f
|{u : f(gY (u)) 6= gC(u)}|
(as used by [7]) and keep all definitions and notations the same as above. This dis-
tance function costs exactly 1 for each element u whose set in Y is not mapped to its
set in C. Using this metric, our algorithm yields a 2-approximation in expectation.





Y :fYC (gY (u))=gC(u)
Pr[Y ].
Balcan et al. [7] observe that this function is symmetric and obeys the triangle




Depending on the application, the guarantee of a 3-approximation in expecta-
tion may not be sufficient. An unlikely sample could have arbitrarily bad behavior.
For example, the probability that our sample is better than a 5-approximation is
not guaranteed to be any higher than 1/2. In this subsection we explore various
ways to use multiple samples to achieve better approximation guarantees.
Since our approximation guarantee is in expectation, it is important to limit
the probability that we choose a bad clustering C ′ (one where E[DC′(Y )] is much
greater than 3E[DC(Y )]). We do this using Markov’s inequality. Since the ap-
proximation ratio is always at least 1 (no solution can be better than the optimal
solution),
Pr[E[DC′(Y )] > (3 + 2ǫ)E[DC(Y )] ≤ 1/(1 + ǫ).
We could attempt to bound the variance in the approximation ratio, however as
the above example illustrates (or any example where most of the probability mass
lies close to the optimal solution, with a small amount of mass at a large distance),
it can be quite bad. Through repeated sampling, we can do much better. Instead
of taking only a single sample clustering, let us take samples C ′1, . . . , C
′
m from the
distribution. The first quantity of interest is the approximation ratio R achieved by
145









Pr[DC′i(X)/E[DC(Y )] > 3 + 2ǫ]
≤ 1/(1 + ǫ)m.
Thus if we want at most a τ probability of having no samples within this distance,
we need m = ⌈log1+ǫ 1/τ⌉ or more samples.
The existence of a sample C ′i which is close to a 3-approximation does not
directly imply that we can determine which of the sample(s) are good. If our appli-
cation allows us to test each of the samples and choose one with the best results,
we may not need to find the one with the best approximation ratio. Otherwise, to
be certain which of the C ′i gives the best approximation ratio, we would need to
know C already (or at least be able to calculate DC(X) knowing X but not C). We
can get around this by taking l additional samples {X1, . . . , Xl}, and computing for
each of the C ′i, the total distance from the Xj’s. We then select the C
′
i with the
minimum such total distance.
We must now consider that the samples X1, . . . , Xl that we draw might give
a total distance larger than its expectation for the “good” C ′i and smaller than the
expectation for a “bad” C ′i. To address this, we now show that when l is sufficiently
large, with high probability even if we don’t select the best C ′i, we will select one
which is close enough. For each C ′i, the expected cost E[DC′i(X)] ≥ E[DC(X)],
and with probability at least 1− τ , for at least one such C ′i, E[DC′i(X)] ≤ (3 + 2ǫ) ·
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E[DC(X)]. We define di =
∑l
j=1DC′i(Xj)/|U |. Since the di are a sum of independent
random variables taking on values in [0, 1], we can apply Chernoff bounds to their
deviation probability. If we take l = (|U |/δ2) · O(log kp), then with probability at
least 1− p all candidate’s distance totals di will be estimated to within (1± δ).
If there exists a candidate with distance total
DC′i(Y ) ≤ E[DC(Y )] · (3 + 2ǫ) · l,
and all such estimates are within (1± δ) of the true totals, then the candidate with
the minimum estimated total has a true total at most ·(3+2ǫ)E[DC(Y )] · l · (1+2δ).
This candidate gives an approximation ratio of (3 + 2ǫ) · (1 + 2δ). Such a candidate
is found with probability at least 1− p− τ .
4.4.3 Experimental Results
Having a 3-approximation algorithm is a nice theoretical result, but it does
not necessarily imply practical benefits. For example, if an optimal solution has
a large expected distance (1/3 of the maximum distance for example), then a 3-
approximation is meaningless. The hope is that networks will only have such bad
behavior if they are inherently not well clusterable. There is some intuitive reason
to believe this is so. If a certain set of nodes often forms the majority of a connected
component and they are in the same component c of an optimal clustering, then
a random clustering Y will likely have a component y that matches with low cost
to c. Meanwhile if the optimal clustering has high cost, that means that few large
groups of nodes consistently form the bulk of a component.
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Figure 4.15: The three networks used in our analysis have very different structures.
The Trust Project Network (top left) has many star formations which affect the
quality of its clusters. The FilmTrust Network (top right) is a more traditionally
organized social network. The Epinions Network (bottom) is much larger and harder
to succinctly characterize.
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In this section we explore what kind of clusterings occur in real trust networks
using various parameters. We examine the Trust Project, FilmTrust [45], and Epin-
ions networks. Visualizations of these networks are shown in Figure 4.15 with their
sizes shown in Table 4.3. In the first two of these networks, users rate their level of
trust (with respect to a specified domain) in their friends. In the Epinions network,
users rate whether they like or dislike statements made by others, and these ratings
can be used as a proxy for ratings of the statements’ authors. In this analysis we
address only positive trust, so unfavorable ratings are discarded.
The Trust Project network is derived from an early Semantic Web trust net-
work [46]. As is shown in Figure 4.15, it has many star patterns. This occurs
when users make connections to many friends who do not, in turn, participate in
the network. Thus, they have no outgoing connections. This affects our ability to
cluster the network. The FilmTrust network is built from a social network in which
users rate movies and how much they trust their friends in that context. As the
visualization shows, it has a more traditional network structure. However, there are
a number of small groups that are disconnected from the giant component. These
are shown as the small subnetworks, often pairs, floating around the edge of the
visualization. Finally, the Epinions network shows social network connections on
the product review site. Trust ratings indicate how much they trust one another’s
reviews.
In all of our networks, ratings form directed trust edges. As a first step we
create an undirected and normalized trust graph. We convert every lone directed
edge into an undirected edge, and whenever two people rate each other, we average
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Network # Nodes # Edges Density
Trust Project 62 105 0.055
FilmTrust 310 774 0.016
Epinions 114,467 717,667 0.0001
Table 4.3: The size and descriptive statistics of our three example networks. Density
is calculated as the ratio of edges to possible edges.
their ratings to form a single undirected edge. The edge weights are then normal-
ized to fall between 1 and 10. Since we need probabilities on the edges instead of
weights, we introduce a global parameter t. An edge with weight w gets probability
max(1, w/t). Therefore when t is small, edge probabilities tend to be high and con-
nected components will be large, and for large t edge probabilities and connected
components will generally be smaller.
For the Trust Project and FilmTrust networks we vary t from 2 to 30, gen-
erating 30 sample clusterings for each value. For the Epinions network, we need
considerably higher values of t to capture the same behavior, so we use a range of
14 to 50. In Figure 4.16 we show the frequencies of each component size and each
component’s benefit, where we define the benefit of a cluster to be its size minus its
cost (or how much less it costs than its maximum possible cost). Due to our choice
of cost function, two clusters each have to share at least half of their nodes to have
any benefit at all. The x-axis shows the value of t, the y-axis shows the component
size (or benefit), and the circle diameters show the how many components are that
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size (or benefit) in our samples. This gives a sense of what size clusters to expect
for different values of t. Values of t < 10 are included for informational purposes,
but may be poor choices in practice, because they give equal weight to all user trust
ratings ≥ t.
Figure 4.17 contains scatter plots of the distances between pairs of randomly
sampled clustererings for all 3 datasets. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, the ex-
pected distance between two randomly chosen clusterings is at most 3 times op-
timal. So these plots demonstrate roughly how similar clusterings are, and what
range E[DC(X)] falls into. When t→ 0, the random graphs lose their randomness
and are always connected. Conversely at t → ∞, the graphs are always discon-
nected. Therefore at the two extremes distances will be 0. Of interest here is the
shape of the curve in between, and specifically for what values of t are there good,
representative clusterings.
From Figures 4.16 and 4.17, it is evident that the Trust Project network does
not produce particularly stable clusters. Most of the benefits, even for relatively
small values of t, are quite small when compared to the larger cluster sizes. This
means that there is not much more than 1/2 overlap between matched clusters.
Instead most of it’s benefit comes from small clusters matching up well. This may
be (in part) a product of star shaped connections. Under the right conditions a star
graph should form a single cluster. But with our algorithm it will form a random
large cluster and many singletons, which will have high distance from another such
random clustering.
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Figure 4.16: The top two plots show component sizes (blue) and benefit sizes (green)
within Trust Project (left) and FilmTrust (right) for t = 2 to 30 with 30 samples
of each. The bottom two plots show the component sizes and benefits for the
Epinions dataset, with the left plot showing small clusters and the right plot the
largest clusters. A circle centered at (x, y) with radius r indicates that the number
of clusters of size (or benefit) y with t = x is proportional to r.
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Distance Between Epinions Clusterings
Figure 4.17: This figure shows costs between randomly sampled clusterings for Trust
Project (top left), FilmTrust (top right), and Epinions (bottom) networks. The
maximum distance between samples in the smaller two networks is approximately
the size of the network, whereas the maximum distance in the Epinions network is
roughly half of its network size.
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The FilmTrust network creates considerably more consistent clusterings. Much
more of the benefit comes from a large, fairly consistent cluster, but considerable
benefit comes from smaller clusters as well. Even with t as high as 20 (which
corresponds to maximum trust giving only a 1/2 edge probability), there are still
large clusters that share a considerable core component, indicating a very stable
cluster. For this network as well as Trust Project, the shape of the cost curves
largely depends on the giant component. If it exists and is stable for a given t, the
costs are low. If it exists but changes significantly with different samples, then some
pairs have low cost, and some have high cost.
In this Epinions dataset, our algorithm consistently identifies a stable giant
component and a number of smaller components of widely varying stability. This
clustering behavior is particularly useful for applications that use the trust values to
boost performance. Trust values can be used in recommender systems to generate
predictive ratings based on a user’s social connections [44]. Integrating information
about trust clusters into traditional recommender systems can significantly improve
the accuracy of recommendations [33]. The smaller groups of size < 30 that identi-





In order to do empirical studies of random graphs we require appropriate
software tools. These tools must be flexible enough to thoroughly explore the data
and a wide range of algorithms, and they must efficiently scale up to graphs of
hundred thousand nodes or more. For smaller graphs, as well as for visualization
and data analysis we use industry-standard platforms such as Mathematica and
Matlab. These tools provide all of the flexibility we need, but they suffer from
critical scalability issues. In this chapter we discuss the special purpose tools which
aid our research. For fast and flexible epidemic simulations we use EpiFast which is
developed and hosted by the Network Dynamics and Simulation Science Laboratory
which is part of the Virginia Bioinformatics Institute at Virginia Tech. Additionally,
as a major component in our work on protective sequestering, we developed a fast
and space efficient implementation of our optimal placement algorithm. Finally,
we develop a random graph analysis package. This package performs our common




For our large-scale epidemic simulations, we use EpiFast [14]. EpiFast provides
a highly flexible framework for modeling epidemics on an individual level. Once
invoked, EpiFast launches parallel processes on a large cluster in order to produce
results quickly. It quantizes time into days, so that locations can be sent to different
machines for processing without incurring much communication overhead.
As input it takes a contact network in person-location format and a configu-
ration file. The configuration file specifies (among other things), the transmission
rate, a distribution on initial infections, how an individual’s state changes once they
contact the disease, and what interventions to use and when. These factors can be
specified on a global level, or specific individuals may be given specific properties.
We use some fine-grained control by specifying which individuals should be initially
infected, and who receives a vaccination on what day. However the interventions
need not be completely determined before running, but can be triggered by the
epidemic’s progression. For example, mass vaccinations may be triggered by a fixed
percentage of the population becoming diagnosed. On an individual level, people
can alter their daily routine if too many of their friends fall ill. This heterogeneity is
a particularly important feature for accurately modeling the complexity of epidemics
in the real-world.
By default, each run of EpiFast (or each iteration within a single run) simulates
a unique, random progression of the epidemic. Its output consists of a list of infected
individuals, along with the day they became infected, and a who transmitted the
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epidemic to them. From this output we construct the vulnerabilities and epidemic
trees necessary for our algorithms.
5.2 Sequestering
We implement our optimal partitioning algorithm in C in order to conduct
experiments. Figure 3.7 describes the core of the algorithm. In order to handle very
large datasets, we chose the memory efficient version which periodically checkpoints
rows in the dynamic programming matrix. The program takes a configuration file
which specifies the person-to-person transmission rate, the group types, how many
groups of each type, and the external infection probabilities of each individual. It
outputs, for every group, the people assigned to that group, and the total number
of expected infections.
5.2.1 Time and Space Complexity
In this section we analyze our implementation’s efficiency. To do so we break
it into two parts, one part specific to the subroutine g and concerning mostly ini-
tialization, and a second part which concerns the main function Sequester.
In initializing the function g (which gives the expected number of infections if
a given set of people are placed into a group as described in Figure 3.8), we compute
and store for each group, and every possible number of initially infected people in
the group, how many people become finally infected in expectation. If we let mi
denote the size of the ith group when sorted by group sizes, then the permanent
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space used to after initialization is
∑
i mi. When computing these values, we need
an m3i sized temporary array for the intermediate computation. The j, x, y entry
in this array records the probability that there are x people infected by a path
of distance at most j, and y people infected at distance exactly j. We achieve a
significant efficiency improvement by truncating any array entry whose magnitude
is below some threshold. The threshold gives an upper bound on the total error
introduced into the final calculation.
Once the initialization is completed, the expected total infection size is the
sum for j = mi, y = 0 and over all x of x times the array entry at j, x, y. Each
entry in these arrays takes at most mi time to compute, for a total initialization
running time order of the sum over all i from 1 to r of mi matrices times m
3
i array




i ) and a
space complexity of order O(maxi m
3
i ).
Instead of computing the stored values exactly we can use a natural Monte-
Carlo simulation process to estimate them to within a factor of ǫ as follows. For
each ℓ from 1 to k and i from 1 to mℓ, generate a random graph G(mℓ, p). For each
simulation j, let the random variable Xℓ,i,j be the sum of the sizes of the connected
components containing nodes 1 through i – the nodes that become infected. For
each ℓ and i, E[Xℓ,i,j] is the value we want to compute. Let Xℓ,i be the average of
our samples j. Using Chernoff bounds, we see that the probability of more than an
ǫ relative error after c samples is
Pr[|Xℓ,j −E[Xℓ,j]| ≥ ǫE[Xℓ,j] ≤ exp(−cE[Xℓ,j ]ǫ2/(3mℓ) ≤ exp(−cǫ2/(3mℓ)).
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If we want an error probability of at most 1/n, we can take c = 3mℓ lnn
ǫ2
. We can
compute the Xℓ,i,j values in time m
2
ℓ using BFS, which gives a total initialization





) and space of O(maxℓ m
2
ℓ).
Once the initialization is complete, we create an array OPT of size n ·
∏
i ui.
For each entry in OPT we create and store a matrix A once taking time and space
O(maxi m
2
i ) and we make
∑
imi calls to g, each of which does O(mi) arithmetic





In the uniform case where all groups are of size m and m · u1 ≈ n (meaning
the total space available is approximately the number of people), this yields a space
complexity of O(n2/m+m2) and a time complexity of O(m5+n2m). The naive way
of backtracking through the array to produce the partition which gives an optimal
result takes no more time than creating the array to begin with, so this is the total
complexity of this phase of the algorithm.
We can greatly improve space efficiency with a factor of 2 cost in running time
using the following observation: to compute the array after person i, all we need to
have stored are the maxt mt rows from OPT (i−maxtmt, ∗) to OPT (i− 1, ∗). If we
only want to compute the optimal expected outbreak size, we can reuse the space
from OPT (i mod m+ 1, j) for every entry OPT (i, j) for a space savings factor of
n/m. If we want to compute the optimal partition however, we need to be able
to backtrack through the OPT array, which we cannot do efficiently if we have to
repeatedly recompute it from scratch for every m people. Instead we have to do
something more clever.
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Theorem 9 Suppose we are given an instance of the Sequestering problem with a
single room type and total capacity O(n). We can compute an optimal partition in




The time complexity and initialization space complexity are taken from above.
Here we prove the improved space bounds for the main phase. For the single group
type case, after computing OPT for c rows (for a value of c to be specified later), we
store the entries for the last m of them, and reuse the space for OPT in computing
the next c people. This takes space mu1 · nc for the saved blocks and c · u1 for
the frequently overwritten memory. Combined they sum to O(mu1n
c
+ cu1) which is
minimized when the two terms are equal or mu1n/c = cu1 and therefore c =
√
mn.




for the array A. As the algorithm backtracks to find the optimal assignment, each
section of c people must be recomputed exactly once from the saved m people before
it. This method results in a factor of 2 increase in running time, which is a reasonable
trade-off.
5.2.2 Resource Usage
During our experimental evaluation, we generated performance statistics of the
algorithm Sequester as implemented in C and running on a reasonably fast Linux
machine. We implemented the basic algorithm, thus we compute g exactly using
dynamic programming and our space complexity is O(n2/m) and not O(n1.5/
√
m)






























































Figure 5.1: Resource usage information for our algorithm’s implementation.
running time that closely matches the formula 5 ∗ 10−7m5 + 1.5 ∗ 10−6n2m seconds.
Roughly this means problem sizes like n = 100, m = 20 complete nearly instantly
and our largest example of n = 10, 000 and m = 40 taking almost three hours. With
regard to memory, the program uses roughly 16n2/m bytes plus 3MB overhead. For
the majority of our runs, the overhead dominates the algorithm’s memory usage,
so we only show detailed results for when n = 10000. On a 32-bit machine, this
nearly reaches the limit of what the basic algorithm can fit into memory. However
at n = 10000 and m = 10, we would expect roughly a factor of
√
n/m ≈ 30 space
savings using the space efficient version.
5.3 Graph Analysis Package
Since much of our work deals with s, t connectivity probabilities and other
properties of large random graphs, we require a tool which can manipulate them as
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needed on a commodity personal computer. For smaller graphs, Mathematica and
Matlab perform excellently. They provide the flexibility to carry out any calculation
or algorithm plus the visualization and statistical tools necessary for fully exploring
the results. Being general-purpose means they are not optimized for working with
large graphs in terms of time or space, and they have trouble scaling up above
tens of thousands of nodes. After exploring some of the existing graph analysis
packages, we determined that making our own was simpler than finding, learning,
and customizing an existing one. In this section we explain our package as well as
some of the trade-offs that went into its design.
Our graph analysis package operates as a persistent command loop. We first
made that decision because graph files hundreds of megabytes long take a significant
amount of time to load. A command loop design allows us to load a graph once
and operate on it many times. Using a command loop we can also string operations
together in an arbitrary order, including a reset back to the original graph, plus we
can execute scripts. While our command language is very simple, we can execute
Turing complete operations by having a scripting language wrapper which pipes
commands to the loop and parses its outputs on the fly.
Because social networks are sparse graphs, and we want common graph oper-
ations like connected component decomposition and iterating over all edges to be
fast, we use an adjacency list graph format. For maximally efficient node accesses,
node ids must be consecutive integers starting with 0. Any graph not in this format
can be pre-precessed once and subsequently loaded quickly. When loading a graph
into memory, we require it have one edge per line, with each edge consisting of two
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node ids and an edge weight. The weights can be arbitrary doubles as the loop
keeps a global “scale factor” variable to map the range onto [0, 1].
We maintain one working graph at a time, which is freed only when a new
graph is loaded or the program exits. However this graph is not static. We can
augment the graph by adding new edges from a file. These new edges remain part
of the graph until it is explicitly reset. We can also generate a random instance of
the graph where each edge’s probability of being kept is its weight times the scale
factor. The removed edges are not freed, but saved so that they can be returned
when we generate a new random instance or reset the graph. We can also compute
a max s− t flow (either on the full graph or a random instance), in which case the
resulting graph contains both the flow and residual graph information. Reseting the
graph, generating a random instance, and adding edges all take linear time. We use
the push-relabel method [51] to find a maximum flow where each vertex with excess
flow tries to send it closer to the sink. This method has worst case complexity of
O(V 2 · E), however appears to run significantly faster in practice.
Our next set of functionality directly addresses connectedness and pairwise
connectivity probabilities. We use depth first search (DFS) for finding the connected
components in linear-time. For estimating probabilities, we have a command which
generates many independent random samples and finds the connected components
in each of them. For each sample we record every node’s component id. These
records are kept active and can be queried until we reset the graph or create a new
set of random samples. To estimate the connectivity between two nodes we compare
their component ids and return the fraction of samples where they are in the same
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component. The samples can be printed directly, or we can print a pairwise path
probability or all path probabilities from a given node. In order to quickly visualize
the variation in path probabilities, we also support quickly giving histogram-like
information for the distances from a specific node. It takes O(k · (V + E)) time to
generate k samples and their connected component records and O(k) time per path
probability query.
The functionality described so far handles positive edges only which is sufficient
for our work in Section 4.1 but not for Section 4.2. We implement one feature
to return the fraction of negative edges between the same connected component,
but our main work for mixing positive and negative edges is the spring embedding
algorithm. We use this algorithm to find a global k-dimensional embedding of nodes
in the graph where the endpoints of positive edges are biased towards each other
and those of negative edges are biased apart. This type of algorithm takes as input
a network, the force functions for positive and negative edges, a dimension for the
embedding, an a termination condition. After simulating many iterative updates of
the system state, it outputs the geometric location of every node.
The spring embedding parameters are all straightforward except the force func-
tions. The attractive force between the endpoints of a positive edge should increase
with distance while a negative edge’s repulsive force should decrease. There are
no other rules, so we leave a great deal of flexibility. We do not want too much
flexibility though, since we compute these forces once per edge on every iteration
and need to do so quickly. Even interpreting a simple mathematical string would
be too inefficient. We choose instead to allow four parameters to completely define
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the forces. The positive force functions take the form a · db where d is the distance
between nodes, a is a real-valued parameter, and b is one, two, or three. The nega-
tive force function takes the form a′ · d−b′ where a′ and b′ have the same constraints
as a and b. This allows us to try out different combinations of functions at runtime.
When a user invokes the spring embedding command for dimension k, we start
by initializing a |V | by k array so that each vertex has a uniformly random point
in [0, 1]k. We also initialize a variable ∆ which is the timestep simulated by the
current iteration. The higher the value of ∆, the further a given force will push
a node in that iteration. We then calculate every edge’s force on its endpoints
using the parameterized force functions. Nodes which are closer together than some
threshold have their forces decreased to prevent arbitrarily large forces. Once every
vertex has its net force calculated, we multiply that force by ∆, divide the force by
the square root of the vertice’s degree, and move the vertex. We return any vertex
pushed outside of the [0, 1]k boundary back within the valid space. At each iteration
we sum the force magnitudes over all of the vertices, and we think of this as the
embedding’s “balance”.
Our algorithm terminates when it reaches either a parameterized maximum
number of iterations, or a small enough sum of forces on the vertices. We added
the second threshold because the smaller the net forces, the more balanced the
embedding. If the network is perfectly balanced, there are no net forces and the
network stabilizes. Borrowing an idea from simulated annealing [97], we also use
the current balance to adjust ∆. If the network moves towards greater balance,
we assume it may be converging towards an equilibrium that we do not want to
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overshoot. In this case we decrease ∆ slightly. On the other hand, if the network
moves away from balance, we assume that it is far from equilibrium and would
benefit by changing faster, so we increase ∆.
Once we compute the embedding, it remains in memory until the graph is reset
of a new embedding is computed. We provide commands to dump the embedding
to a file, or query the distance between a pair of points. Additionally, we support
batch processing of all of the graph’s edges. One command will output to a file one
line per edge showing the ids of its endpoints, its sign and magnitude, the estimated
path probability between its endpoints, and their embedded distance. We designed




Even long before the first computers, social connections have profoundly af-
fected everyday life from our areas of disease transmission and extending trust to
many others like economic activity, justice, and politics. Recently, they have become
both more important (due to expanded communication networks and the ability to
travel to a different city or country quickly and easily) and easier to capture (online
networks are recorded exactly and population networks can be approximated). In
addition, ever increasing computational speed and storage allows us to study large
social networks in detail mathematically. Our work focuses on one particularly im-
portant aspect of these networks – the affects of numerous, interdependent paths
of connectivity within these networks. Understanding how to use and manipulate
the collective strength of these paths leads us to interesting algorithmic solutions
to important problems. Within this space we focus on two specific applications:
epidemic mitigation and social trust inference.
In the area of epidemic mitigation we develop two new algorithms. For protect-
ing the general population we introduce the heuristic to target vaccinations based
upon individuals’ epidemic subtree sizes. We derive this heuristic from a novel
graph-theoretic proof about vertex cuts in a random graph. We show empirically
that this method performs similarly to two other heuristics for minimizing total
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infections on a particular, realistic contact network. We conclude by arguing why
that network’s properties cause our results, and what to look for in a network which
would produce different results.
Our second epidemic mitigation algorithm protects a small but important sub-
population from an at-large epidemic by removing them from the general population
and carefully isolating them into groups, usually of some maximum size. We model
the structure of the resulting groups as a random graph and show through a prob-
abilistic argument how to optimally partition people into these groups. We show
that in a realistic setting an optimal solution can lead to considerably fewer final
infections than a naive one. Because protective sequestering involves much more
than how to place individuals into isolated groups, we use our placement algorithm
as a basis for exploring the other trade-offs involved and how sensitive the infections
rates are to real-world problems like estimation error and logistics.
Both of these sides of epidemic mitigation have significant open problems to
consider. Some major directions for further work include:
• What properties do much larger (state or country-wide) contact networks have,
and how do those properties effect various vaccination strategies?
• More information about an epidemic arises as it runs its course – taking some
transmission paths by not others. Can we use this information as it becomes
available to make better decision about how to counter the epidemic?
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• If the vaccination strategy is public, could some individuals alter their behavior
in a way that makes the epidemic worse in order to increase their likelihood
of receiving a vaccination?
• A simulated population may resemble a real population, but there is no map-
ping from individuals in one to the other. Can we use a targeted vaccination
strategy in a simulated network to aid in targeted vaccinations in a similar
real one?
• In a real protective sequestering scenario we cannot perfectly isolate a large
number of individuals. What types of connections exist, and how do they
effect the results?
We also bring a graph-theoretic approach to the problem of social network
trust inference. We develop several important algorithms: using path probabilities
in a random-graph as an indicator for inferred trust, using spring embedding to
infer trust based upon both trust and distrust information, and linear-time trust
clustering.
Our first contribution – the idea to relate trust in a social network to edge and
path probabilities in a random-graph – directly brings graph theory to a practical
problem. Because of the mathematical basis of our approach, we immediately realize
a number of benefits, including a trust metric space for clustering or other applica-
tions. We explore the parameter space of our algorithm, and show it to be fairly
robust to the specific trust to probability mapping, though reasoning analytically
about a given network shows how to tune the function to get the most information
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out of the results. A wide range of dataset sizes motivates our development of sev-
eral variants of the algorithm which trade-off space and running-time in one phase
or another. Experimental results on real trust networks provides validation for our
approach.
We proceed by addressing how distrust fits into our social trust framework.
Because there is no distrust analog for our Bayesian chain view of trust paths, we
require a new approach – inferred trust as the results of a spring embedding process.
Our spring embedding algorithm does not have the nice graph-theoretic structure as
the path probability approach, but we find that it adds important information on top
of the algorithms which use positive trust only. As usual, we validate the combined
trust inference algorithm empirically, using it for hidden edge sign prediction and
cluster reconstruction.
Finally we show that when clustering is the goal of trust inference, a simple
and very fast algorithm can bypass the computation of trust distances and find a
clustering directly. Our main contribution here is not the algorithm itself but the
analysis behind it. We show that a sample clustering from a fixed distribution gives
an approximately central clustering for that distribution under a particular distance
metric on clusterings. As is often the case, this algorithm is meaningful on some
networks but not on others. We examine its behavior on several real datasets and
discuss when it will likely give useful results.
Within trust inference, major open problems include:
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• Can we quantify and adjust our algorithms for the non-uniformilty in how
users rate each other?
• The new edge prediction problem: how well can a trust inference algorithm
predict which edges will be added to a social network and which edges will
change their sign/magnitude?
• Do social networks have “ground truth” clusterings (or overlapping cluster-
ings) and can we detect them using trust-based methods?
• Can organizations make use of social trust clustering to form teams with high
cohesion and productivity?
• Alternatively, can organizations or users cultivate new trust links carefully to
maximize their effect on the trust network?
In all of the above cases, when working on complex network problems we
recognize the importance of developing both a deep, mathematical understanding
of the structures involved and also empirical results which demonstrate how they
apply in a realistic setting. This interplay between theory and data-driven results
goes well beyond the obvious goal of demonstrating an algorithm’s effectiveness.
We also work to understand when and why an algorithm performs better than its
guarantees, and how to use knowledge of the structure of a particular dataset to
further refine the algorithm: such as choosing a vaccination strategy based upon
how embedded a contact network is or tuning the trust to edge probability function
to maximize the information content of connectivity probabilities.
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